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Summary 
Infections occurring as a result of stay in hospitals are costly for society and cause much 
suffering in the patients. A sizeable proportion of these hospital acquired infections are 
preventable. The hospital patient population is changing with more patients being susceptible 
to opportunistic infections. The Pseudomonas species is ranked among the top ten causes of 
bacteraemias in hospitals. Medical devices have often been reported to cause outbreaks in 
hospitals. 
The overall aims of this thesis were to investigate a large outbreak of Pseudomonas infections 
and gain knowledge from it, to explore theories for causality and responsibility, and to 
describe the epidemiology and investigate risk factors for contracting invasive Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa infection. 
The research originates from a large outbreak of P. aeruginosa infection discovered in 2002 
which was caused by a contaminated medical device. From it we explore four areas: 1. the 
outbreak investigation; 2. the contamination of the medical device involved; 3. theories for 
causality of the outbreak; and 4. the epidemiology of invasive Pseudomonas aeruginosa 
infection. 
Although the research in time moved from the specific P. aeruginosa outbreak to explore 
more general issues the thesis is organised the other way moving from the general to the 
specific as this gives a better introduction to the subject and is more pedagogical.  
 
Paper I describes an outbreak investigation of P. aeruginosa infections, in particular how a 
nationwide, multicentre investigation was organised and conducted. The team-work and 
combination of epidemiological and microbiological methods were essential in finding the 
cause and stopping the outbreak. A total of 231 patients from 24 hospitals were identified 
with the outbreak strain of Pseudomonas aeruginosa; 71 of them died while hospitalised. 
Genotypically identical strains of the bacterium were isolated from patients, several batches 
of the Dent-O-Sept swab and from the production plant. We conclude that susceptible patient 
groups should use only documented quality-controlled, high-level disinfected products and 
items in the oropharynx. 
Paper II describes the investigation of the swabs, the moisturising liquid and the production 
facility. A total of 76 swabs from 12 different batches produced over a period of 30 weeks 
were contaminated with the outbreak strain of Pseudomonas aeruginosa. Many swabs were 
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also contaminated with other microbes. More than 250 of 1565 examined swabs were 
contaminated with one or more microbial species. A system audit revealed serious breaches of 
production regulations. Biofilm formation in the wet part of the production is proposed as the 
most plausible explanation for the continuous contamination of the swabs. The legal 
requirements for microbiological purity of medical devices in Class 1 are not optimal. 
Paper III explores the theories for causality of the outbreak of Pseudomonas aeruginosa 
infections. Applying various theories for causality and responsibility from different fields like 
science, philosophy and law on the actors and acts involved in the outbreak helped elucidating 
their roles and responsibilities, especially legal theories and counterfactual reasoning. We 
conclude that many factors contributed to causing the outbreak, but that contamination of a 
medical device in the production facility was the major necessary condition. The reuse of the 
medical device in hospitals contributed primarily to the size of the outbreak. In addition there 
were many errors in the chain from the production of the swabs, through purchasing and 
storage systems in the health care institutions to the use of the swabs and reporting of 
defective devices. The unintended error by its producer – and to a minor extent by the hospital 
practice – was mainly due to non-application of relevant knowledge and skills, and appears to 
constitute professional negligence. Due to factors outside the discourse of causality, no one 
was criminally charged for the outbreak. 
Paper IV investigates the epidemiology of invasive Pseudomonas aeruginosa infection in 
Norway. Although P. aeruginosa usually do not cause infection in healthy persons, it 
frequently does in patients with certain underlying diseases, and in patients with disrupted 
barriers, especially in the ICU. Invasive P. aeruginosa infection is a rare disease with an 
incidence rate of 3.16 per 100 000 person-years at risk or 0.20 per 1 000 hospital stays, but 
very serious for those contracting it with a 30 day case fatality rate of 33%. Patients with 
malignant neoplasms of lymphoid and haematopoietic tissue and other diseases of blood and 
blood-forming organs have the highest risk of infection. Prudent antibiotic use is one possible 
explanation for much lower rates of infection in Norway compared with all other published 
studies. 
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1. General introduction   
 
1.1. Microbes and hosts   
Infections have always been a serious threat to mankind, causing disease and death. Through 
much of historic times man has fought a battle against infectious diseases and its causes. 
Religious and traditional rules were created to prevent, treat and control the diseases and 
epidemics (1). Some were based on experience like cleanliness and hygienic measures; others 
were mere superstition (2), like phlebotomy to cure infections. When microbes were 
discovered as causes of infectious diseases, the search for cures were intensified and with the 
advent of antimicrobial therapy some voices in the medical community heralded the end of 
the era of infectious diseases. The emergence of antibiotic resistance and the increase in the 
number of debilitated persons with increased susceptibility for infections have curbed this 
optimism.  
Microbes play a natural part in the interaction with humans. They colonise the skin, the outer 
part of certain orifices and are important for food digestion in the colon and distal ileum. 
Prudent use of antimicrobials and disinfectants are believed to be important to minimise the 
disturbance of equilibrium between the different microbes and between microbes and hosts 
(3). 
Microbes are categorised in many ways, one is by pathogenicity. Some bacteria, like Yersinia 
pestis or Vibrio cholera usually cause disease in the human host and are called pathogenic 
whereas others like coagulase negative staphylococci under normal circumstances rarely 
cause disease and are called apathogenic. In between these two groups there is a continuum of 
pathogenicity of microbes that can cause disease under certain circumstances when one or 
more defence mechanisms fail, like disruption of barriers introducing bacteria into sterile 
body sites or the weakening of immunity during cancer treatment. This group of microbes is 
called opportunistic. Pseudomonas aeruginosa is an opportunistic bacterium (4-7). In 
addition, within each species of microbes there may be great variability. Among E. coli for 
example one may find apathogenic, opportunistic and pathogenic strains depending on 
presence of virulence factors. 
1.2. Communicable diseases 
Epidemiology of communicable diseases differs from epidemiology of chronic diseases 
mainly in that the patient, the case, can become infectious and thus be the source of disease 
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for new cases. The epidemic potential for an infectious disease is mathematically described 
through the basic reproductive rate, called R0. It is dependent on the risk of transmission per 
contact (), the average number of contacts () and the duration of infectivity for an infected 
person (D), mathematically described as: R0 =   ×  × D (8). In order for an infectious 
disease to expand and spread each infected person on average has to infect more than one new 
person, i.e. R0 >1. Some non-infectious diseases can be said to spread in populations through 
altered behaviour patterns. Diet and drinking trends may spread and cause epidemics of 
obesity and alcoholism. In addition, some infections are caused by microorganisms already 
present on the patient, the so called endogenic infections. However, in epidemiology 
communicable diseases and infectious diseases are usually seen as synonyms (9). 
A conceptual model for communicable disease spread is the chain of infection (Figure 1) (1, 
10). This model consists of six links which all have to be present for an infection to spread. If 
one link is broken, propagation ceases. Consequently the model is used in infection control 
and prevention to study where to intervene to prevent the spread of infections and to stop 
outbreaks.  
Figure 1. The chain of infection 
 
 
 
1. Infectious 
agent 
2. Source/reservoir 
/infected person 
3. Portal of exit 
4. Route of 
transmission 
5. Portal of entry 
6. Susceptible 
host 
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To break the chain if infection in the hospital setting one needs to analyse each link.  
1. Infectious agent: All pathogenic microbes, most opportunistic and even some microbes 
generally considered to be apathogenic, may cause infections due to the susceptibility of 
many patients. A general reduction of all potentially pathogenic microbes would reduce 
the risk of infection. 
2. Source/reservoir/infected person: There are three groups of reservoirs in hospitals, a) 
patients and personnel, b) the hospital environment, and c) medical devices, 
pharmaceuticals, food and water.   
2 a) patients and personnel: Infectious people can be treated and made non-infectious.  
2 b) the hospital environment: Contaminated surfaces can be cleaned and disinfected. 
Certain areas are more important to control like door knobs, hand rails and switches where 
many people touch frequently whereas ceilings and floors are less important from an 
infection control perspective. For moisture-prone bacteria wet areas like sinks, faucets, 
flasks, other containers and tubes need to be disinfected and controlled regularly. One 
needs to analyse where bacteria can multiply into numbers posing as a risk for patients 
and implement preventive measures. In specialised rooms like operating theatres even the 
air needs to be monitored for bacterial contamination.  
2c) medical devices, pharmaceuticals, food and water: Depending on type of use 
medical devices need to be clean, disinfected or sterilised and there needs to be 
monitoring systems in place to verify the microbial status of the products. In many 
hospital outbreaks where medical devices have been involved, deficiencies in the 
cleaning, disinfecting, and sterilising process of reusable equipment and in the control 
systems of these processes have been demonstrated. Food and drinking water is not sterile 
and may contain microbes that can cause infections in susceptible patient groups. 
Potentially harmful foods have to be removed for these selected groups. 
3. Portal of exit: The main portals of exit of microbes from a patient are the mouth and 
airways, urethra, anus, damaged skin (where blood and pus can emerge), and intact skin. 
To prevent microbe containing body fluids, solid body parts or excretions from being 
transmitted, the mouth and nose can be covered with a surgical mask, cuts, bruises and 
abscesses covered with bandages, diapers used and intact skin can be covered to prevent 
the spread of exfoliations. 
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4. Route of transmission: There are mainly three transmission routes: a) direct and indirect 
contact transmission, b) droplet transmission and c) airborne transmission. Direct and 
indirect contact transmission is by far the most important mode of transmission and the 
hands of health care workers are in most hospital hygiene publications considered to be 
the most important vehicle for transport of infectious agents in the hospital. Isolation and 
quarantine or other ways of physical distancing to prevent the infectious from coming into 
contact with the non-infected are other methods for breaking the route of transmission. 
The measures instituted depend mainly on the mode of transmission for the particular 
infectious agent and on the severity of disease that it may cause. 
5. Portal of entry: This is often the reverse of link 3 where all natural and artificial orifices 
and the intact skin and other outer surfaces can be a portal. By blocking the portal of entry 
using a surgical mask or respirator covering the mouth and nose, covering intact or cut 
skin, eyes etc. and depending on the mode of transmission, one can block the infectious 
agent from entering. In the hospital setting there are many more entry portals due to 
artificial openings stemming from surgery, catheters and other medical devices which 
have broken many of the natural defence barriers. That is why it is so important only to 
use quality-controlled equipment and to perform all critical procedures with the highest 
hygienic standards.  
6. Susceptible host: In the hospital, many patients are especially susceptible for contracting 
infections. The main means of reducing their susceptibility is through immunisations 
where a vaccine is available and through improving their general conditions in order to 
better fight off any intruding microbe. In some instances like for certain surgical 
procedures short course antibiotic prophylaxis is given to reduce the risk of infection. 
1.3. Hospital acquired infections   
The risk of contracting an infection is much larger inside a hospital than outside. There are 
several reasons for this.   
Firstly, people in hospitals are already ill. They are often bedridden and pacified making them 
more susceptible to infections of the skin and airways. Many patients have a reduced capacity 
to battle infections due to a weakened immune system. Trauma, surgical procedures and 
medical devices like catheters have disrupted natural defence barriers making it easier for 
microbes to gain access and cause infection.   
Secondly, in hospitals there are many patients with infectious diseases and these may be 
infectious sources to other patients who concequently more easily may contract new 
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microbes. And the microbes are easily transferred from patient to patient through direct or 
indirect contact via health care workers, fixture or medical devices, or for some microbes via 
droplets or through the air.   
Thirdly, the use of antimicrobials per population is much larger inside hospitals than in the 
general community (although the total consumption is much larger outside) (3). This 
antibiotic pressure drives a selection for more resistant strains of bacteria causing the bacterial 
flora in hospitals to be quite different from the one outside. All this makes the risk of 
contracting an infection much higher in hospitals than outside. It also makes it more difficult 
to treat due to antibiotic resistance and the susceptibility of the patients. 
A hospital acquired infection (HAI) is usually defined as an infection that follows a stay in 
hospital, but that was not present or incubating at the time of admission to the hospital (11). 
For bacterial infections a standard incubation period of 48 hours is usually used meaning that 
infections occurring at least 48 hours after admission to the hospital are considered to be 
hospital acquired. Hospital acquired is synonymous to nosocomial which is the Greek word 
pertaining hospital. A wider term often used is health care associated infections which 
includes all infections that can be associated with hospitals, nursing homes or the outpatient 
setting in primary or specialist health care. Although an infection may be hospital acquired, 
this does not necessarily mean the patient acquired the microbe inside the hospital. A large 
proportion of HAIs results from microbes belonging to the patient’s normal bacterial flora. 
Catheter-related urinary tract infections (UTIs) may be caused by E. coli from the patient’s 
intestinal flora and a surgical site infection from the patient’s normal skin flora.  
1.4. Surveillance of infectious diseases   
Public health surveillance is defined as the ongoing systematic collection, analysis, and 
interpretation of outcome-specific data essential to the planning, implementation and 
evaluation of public health practice, closely integrated with the timely dissemination of these 
data to those who need to know (12). The final link in the surveillance chain is the application 
of these data to prevention and control. 
Surveillance of infectious diseases can be categorised in several ways (see Table 1 for  
categorisation 1a – 6b). In Norway the Norwegian Notification System for Communicable 
Diseases (in Norwegian abbreviated MSIS) consists of several subsystems. The system for the 
major part of notifiable diseases in MSIS is a cohort (category 1b) for the whole country (2b) 
receiving clinical and microbiological information (3a and b) on an individual basis (4b), is 
mostly passive (5b) but with some active follow-up of missing data (5a) and mainly manual 
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(6a) but with an aim to increase the electronic transfer, especially from medical 
microbiological laboratories (6b). Most developed countries have somewhat similar systems. 
In the period 1975-1991 detection of most bacteria from blood or cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) 
were individually reportable from medical microbiological laboratories to MSIS. 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa was among the bacteria to be notified but MSIS did not publish 
tables on a bacterial genus level, only based on the site of infection where the microbes were 
detected from. 
For HAI, Norway has had a tradition since 1979 of repeated national point prevalence studies 
(in Norwegian abbreviated PIAH). On a given day and time all patients occupying a bed in 
somatic wards in hospitals are counted (denominator) as are those with one of the four most 
frequent HAIs: UTIs, lower respiratory tract infections, surgical site infections and blood 
stream infections (numerator). The infections are not specified by causative microbial agent, 
so the number of P. aeruginosa infections cannot be specified. Numerators and denominators 
are summed up by ward and hospital and aggregated data sent to the Norwegian Institute of 
Public Health (NIPH). From 2002 all hospitals and nursing homes have been asked to submit 
data to NIPH twice-yearly. From 2004 they have had the opportunity to enter the date 
electronically via Internet. (According to the list this surveillance system is: 1a, 2b, 3a, 4a, 5a, 
6b.) 
In 2005 NIPH implemented a national surveillance system for hospital infections (in 
Norwegian abbreviated NOIS). In this system, surgical site infections following certain 
surgical procedures will be subject to surveillance during a given 3-month period each year. 
The system is in accordance with the European hospital surveillance network (Hospitals in 
Europe Link for Infection Control through Surveillance (HELICS) / Improving Patient Safety 
in Europe (IPSE)) which in turn is based on the National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance 
System (NNIS) from The United States of America (USA). Participation in NOIS is 
mandatory for all hospitals. (According to the list this surveillance system is: 1b, 2b, 3a, 4b, 
5a, 6b.) In the NOIS system the causative microbial agent is not specified. 
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Table 1. Categorisation of systems for surveillance of infectious diseases, with three 
Norwegian systems as examples. 
 
Category Description MSIS PIAH NOIS 
1. By study type a. Repeated cross-sectional study 
(prevalence study or survey) 
 X  
 b. Cohort study (incidence study) X  X 
2. By selection of 
reporters 
a. Sentinel reporting    
 b. Regional or total coverage X X X 
3. By source of 
information 
a. Clinical information X X X 
 b. Microbiological detection and 
information 
X   
 c. Serological marker of infection    
 d. Surrogate markers of infection (Hospital 
economical reimbursements, mortality 
statistics, work force absenteeism etc.) 
   
4. By type of data a. Aggregated data  X  
 b. Individual data X  X 
5. By type of data 
collection 
a. Active surveillance (X) X X 
 b. Passive surveillance X   
6. By mode of data 
transfer 
a. Manual, paper-based system X   
 b. Electronic, automated system (X) X X 
 
In some Norwegian hospitals with on-site microbiological laboratories infection control 
personnel get regular reports of all detections of certain indicator bacteria. For some they even 
can get alerted after single findings. There is no national standard for which bacteria to cover 
or how to report. By selecting P. aeruginosa as an indicator bacterium the hospitals can 
measure the occurrence of detection of this microbe.  
Nationally and internationally there is increased emphasis on patient safety and quality 
assurance systems. Hospitals are increasingly required to measure and report on risks for 
hazards occurring in hospitals and to set up plans for minimising these risks. Surveillance 
systems form a basis for these efforts and increasing resources are spent on developing, 
improving and implementing systems for surveillance of infectious diseases in hospitals.  
In Norway, NOIS is currently covering surveillance of surgical site infections following a few 
surgical procedures. In addition to include more surgical procedures new modules are being 
developed in other high risk areas for acquiring infections in hospitals as in intensive care 
units (ICU). Modules are also being developed to more detailed measure the consumption of 
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antimicrobial drugs in hospitals in order to detect overuse and misuse, and consequently to be 
able to suggest alterations and improvements. Development of better systems for on-site 
microbiological laboratory surveillance will also be a priority in the coming years. Improved 
and better accessible databases will ease this development. In addition surveillance systems 
measuring the incidence of infections and of antibiotic use in nursing homes are being piloted.  
To date, only results from national prevalence studies have been published in scientific papers 
(13-21). Results from NOIS have only been published on NIPH's Internet pages but several 
papers will be submitted for publication in the near future.  
1.5. Outbreak investigations   
Outbreak investigations in hospitals and elsewhere follow the same general structure and 
regardless of causative agent. An outbreak can be defined in several ways, the simplest being 
“an event involving more cases than usual”. A more elaborate definition is: An event 
involving more cases than expected of a certain disease within a given time and area. Another 
definition is two or more cases of the same disease and with a presumed common source (22).  
Outbreaks in hospitals are either common source outbreaks or caused by local spread via 
patients, personnel, equipment or environment, or to a lesser degree, through air. One can also 
find mixed-pattern outbreaks where a common source introduces the microbe which then in 
turn spreads locally.  
1. Common source 
a. Medical devices, medicine or other remedy produced locally or procured 
b. Food, drinks or water produced locally or procured 
c. A fixed, maintained source in the hospital (contaminated sink, faucet, ice machine, 
flower pots and vases, ventilator system or other) 
d. An environmental condition that enables microbiological growth, e.g. moist walls 
or ceilings where fungus or bacteria can grow 
e. A chronic carrier among the personnel (e.g. a chronic MRSA (Methicillin resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus) nasal carrier or a surgeon with a chronic blood-borne viral 
infection transmitting to some of her patients during surgery) 
2. Local spread 
a. Contact transmission from person to person (patients and personnel), either 
directly or indirectly via the environment 
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b. Droplet transmission from person to person being in close proximity to each other 
(usually less than 1 meter)  
c. Airborne transmission where microbes can travel longer distances through air (i.e. 
more than 1 meter) 
Outbreaks caused by P. aeruginosa can either be common source or through local spread. As 
the bacterium has affinity for water, moist products, moist environment, or moist areas of the 
human body are usually the reservoir for the bacterium. The spread is usually through contact, 
but droplet transmission can also occur, especially from droplet generating procedures.  
There are two main ways of detecting outbreaks 
1. Indicator based surveillance: Ongoing routine surveillance systems detect an increased 
number or cases under surveillance or unusual patterns in the data. 
2. Event based surveillance: Outbreaks are detected through unstructured reporting systems 
like media, international alerts, outbreak reporting, and unusual events reporting from the 
health services.  
 
It is crucial to have systems in place to detect outbreaks as early as possible. Better and more 
elaborate surveillance systems for events, diseases and microbes will improve our ability for 
early detection. However, the more sensitive a system is the more “noise” is also detected. 
And no matter how elaborate an indicator based surveillance system is in detecting outbreaks, 
we always will have to appreciate the unease or sixth sense of health care personnel as a 
valuable, additional alert system.  
In outbreak investigations there is a range of tasks to undertake, preferably in a logical, 
chronological order, although many of the tasks needs to be performed in parallel or repeated 
several times.  
The following major tasks for outbreak investigations can be listed (12, 22):  
• Prepare and plan 
o Have a general, structured plan ready.  
o Know your potential collaborators, their legal position and skills.  
o Maintain your skill through training. 
• Detect and verify 
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o Have a system in place to receive and assess warnings and notifications about 
possible outbreaks in order to determine whether further investigations are 
necessary. 
• Alert and inform stakeholders 
o To mitigate the extent and consequences of an outbreak it is important to 
notify all relevant stakeholders. Norwegian laws and regulations give detailed 
instructions on whom to inform and when. For example all suspected and 
verified outbreaks in health care institutions are to be reported immediately to 
the chief medical officer in the county and to NIPH. (23, 24)  
• Make a case definition, identify and verify cases 
o Keep in mind that the case definition can change over time as the knowledge 
of the outbreak increases. For example one may in the beginning of an 
outbreak use a syndromic diagnosis to be replaced by an etiologic diagnosis 
later. 
• Describe the outbreak in terms of time, place and person 
o Use basic, epidemiological tools. Describe also who are at risk of becoming ill.  
• Generate hypotheses 
o Base your hypotheses on all available information at the time 
• Test hypotheses 
o Once hypotheses are generated they are to be tested against the information 
gathered. The main tools are: 
1. Epidemiological studies 
2. Microbiological sampling 
3. Performing environmental investigations and assessments 
o Based on the preliminary findings from the hypothesis testing, decide on 
whether to plan for a more systematic study. 
• Implement control and preventive measures 
o If the outbreak is sufficiently serious it may be necessary to implement 
measures on limited knowledge 
• Communicate findings 
o Keep detailed minutes of all actions from the very start 
o Prepare a written report 
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o Keep the mass media informed. Coordinate the main messages with the other 
stakeholders. In the past years increasing time is spent on keeping the mass 
media informed. When the outbreak involves children, deaths, differences of 
opinion among investigators or stakeholders, errors made or political issues, 
the media attention can be particularly intense.  
 
In outbreak investigations the lack of time is in conflict with the need to be precise, 
systematic and deliberate. This urgency is the main difference between outbreak 
investigations and prospectively planned epidemiological studies. The ideal epidemiological 
study is prospective, well planned, with unambiguous definitions and clear and profound 
hypotheses to be tested. This would be ideal for outbreak investigations as well but is not 
feasible most of the time, and one need to make compromises. For some outbreaks the 
number of cases is few and the statistical power may be low. For outbreaks with serious 
outcomes like death and debilitating disease the need for a quick result may force the 
investigators to compromise on the accuracy of the protocol. As a consequence all results 
from an outbreak investigation need to be interpreted with caution. When the media pressure 
is high and the public outcry to come up with an explanation is loud, it is tempting to 
conclude prematurely and too confidently.  
Another contrast with planned epidemiological studies is that the hypotheses, definitions and 
the protocol may change over time. At the start of an outbreak investigation there is little 
knowledge so the investigation needs to begin broadly. As knowledge is gained, hypotheses 
can be more specific, definitions narrower and the protocol more structured. In addition it 
may be necessary to implement control measures before the investigation is complete which 
can make it more difficult to come up with clear results. However, whereas the aim of many 
planned epidemiological studies is to detect small differences between various exposed 
groups, the main aim of an outbreak investigation is detect the reasons for the outbreak in 
order to prevent further cases. 
1.6. Medical devices   
Prior to 1995 unsterile medical devices were poorly regulated in Norway. Products like mouth 
swabs were only regulated through general regulations on product control. In 1995 the Act on 
medical devices and its regulation were introduced (24, 25). The purpose of the Act and its 
regulation is to prevent harmful effects, mishaps and accidents and to ensure that medical 
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devices is tested and used in a professional and ethically justifiable way (24). When in doubt 
the Ministry of health and care defines whether a product is to be called medical device.  
Through the European Economic Area Agreement Norway abides by much of the legislation 
within the European Union (EU), including European Council Directive 93/42/EEC 
concerning medical devices (26). Norwegian jurisdiction on medical devices today is to a 
large extent, direct translations of EU council directives.  
A medical device is defined in the Council Directive as: 
“’medical device’ means any instrument, apparatus, appliance, material or other article, 
whether used alone or in combination, including the software necessary for its proper 
application intended by the manufacturer to be used for human beings for the purpose of:  
• diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, treatment or alleviation of disease,  
• diagnosis, monitoring, treatment, alleviation of or compensation for an injury or 
handicap,  
• investigation, replacement or modification of the anatomy or of a physiological 
process,  
• control of conception,  
and which does not achieve its principal intended action in or on the human body by 
pharmacological, immunological or metabolic means, but which may be assisted in its 
function by such means; “ (26) 
The Directive classifies medical devices into four classes, I, IIa, IIb and III. The classification 
rules are based on the vulnerability of the human body taking account of the potential risks 
associated with the technical design and manufacture of the devices. Annex IX of the 
Directive gives detailed rules for classification of medical devices into these four classes. 
In order to mark a medical device with CE (Communauté Européenne) the Council Directive 
states that the producer must produce a declaration of conformity. The declaration of 
conformity is the procedure whereby the manufacturer ensures and declares that the products 
concerned meet the provisions of the Directive which apply to them. The list of provisions is 
quite detailed. 
For non-invasive medical devices in Class I, there are no demands for sterility. The devices 
must, when used, “not compromise the clinical condition or the safety of patients”. “The 
devices and manufacturing processes must be designed in such a way as to eliminate or 
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reduce as far as possible the risk of infection to the patient, user and third parties.” Beyond 
this, the directive does not specify the microbial quality of the product.  
In comparison, pharmaceutical preparations for use in the respiratory tract are according to 
the European Pharmacopoeia classified in a Category 2 where – in addition to other microbio-
logical requirements – the absence of Pseudomonas aeruginosa needs to be documented (27).  
In the aftermath of the outbreak of Pseudomonas aeruginosa described in this thesis there 
were public discussions on how to classify the Dent-O-Sept swab (Figure 2). Was it a medical 
device or a cosmetic product? The Act (28) and Regulation on cosmetics is rather general and 
defines cosmetics and body care products as: “Any product intended for use on the bodily 
surface (like skin, head hair and other hair growth, nails, lips and external genitals) or on the 
teeth and the mucosa of the oral cavity, in order to exclusively or mainly cleanse, scent or 
change their appearance or influence bodily odours or protect them or maintain them in good 
condition.” (29). The Regulation also states that the producer shall produce and have available 
a dossier which describes “The physico-chemical and microbiological specifications for the 
raw materials and the finished product and the purity and microbiological control criteria of 
the cosmetic product”. This is in accordance with EU legislation (30). Although the 
legislation is rather general the European Commission has several scientific committees to 
provide more detailed guidelines and opinions. The DG Health and Consumer Protection’s 
Scientific Committee on Consumer Products has issued Notes of guidance for the testing of 
cosmetic ingredients and their safety evaluation, currently in its 6th revision. These “Notes of 
Guidance” should not be seen as a checklist, but have been compiled to provide assistance in 
the complex process of the testing and safety evaluation of cosmetic ingredients. In its chapter 
6-4: Guidelines on microbiological quality of the finished cosmetic product it is – among 
other requirements – specifically stated that Pseudomonas aeruginosa must not be detectable 
in cosmetic products (31). In addition it recommends challenge testing with Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa, Staphylococcus aureus and Candida albicans to test the efficacy of the 
preservation. However, this challenge testing does not take into account the altered 
microbiological properties of biofilm formation as described in chapter 1.8 of the thesis. It is 
also worth noting that the requirements for microbiological purity and product 
documentations are stricter for cosmetics and for comparable pharmaceutical products than 
for medical devices, class I. The producer of the Dent-O-Sept swab as well as the national 
health authorities agreed on classifying the Dent-O-Sept swab as a medical device, class I and 
not a cosmetic product.  
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Figure 2. The Dent-O-Sept swab, a non-invasive medical device in Class I. 
 
 
 
1.6.1. Use of medical devices in hospitals and its control 
The industry of medical devices is big business. According to the European commission when 
it launched the revision to the Medical Device Directives in 2005, there are some 10 000 
types of medical devices from some 7 000 business entities in Europe employing upwards of 
350 000 Europeans in the EU. The products range from simple bandages and spectacles, 
through life maintaining implantable devices, equipment to screen and diagnose disease and 
health conditions, to the most sophisticated diagnostic imaging and minimal invasive surgery 
equipment (32).  
There are no national statistics on the use of medical equipment in Norway. A network 
organisation supporting suppliers to the health sector (Leverandørforeningen for 
helsesektoren) has indicated that the total sales of equipment to the hospitals amounts to 8-10 
billion NOK annually where approximately half the sum concerns medical devices.  
Infection control personnel in hospitals have indicated increasing complexity of highly 
advanced, technical machinery, including ventilators. Many of them are difficult to clean and 
disinfect and some are not possible to check whether cleaning and disinfection have been 
effective. The personell also claim an increasing use of single-use equipment all over the 
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western world. Many of these devices are expensive and for some years there has been an 
international debate on reprocessing of expensive single-use devices for reuse.  
According to national regulations all hospitals must have written guidelines on the purchase 
and control of medical devices (33). It is recommended that infection control personnel take 
part in all purchases of medical devices when relevant for infection control. The purchasing 
process is not always performed according to guidelines in most hospitals. 
The producer, seller, owner, and user of medical devices are all obliged to report errors of 
medical devices according to previous and current legislation (25). Depending on type of 
equipment and type of error (product error, electrical error, error concerning radiation, error in 
use of product) there are different reporting systems. The efficiency and completeness of the 
reporting systems have been questioned (34). For years there has been ongoing work to 
improve the error reporting systems from the health care services. 
1.6.2. Contamination of medical devices 
Medical devices may be contaminated in each of the steps from ingredients and building 
materials, trough production, packing and transport to storage, use and reuse of the final 
product (Table 2). 
Table 2. Critical areas in the production and use of medical devices; problems and possible 
solutions. 
Area Problem Solutions 
Ingredients, building 
materials 
Any of the components used to 
make up the product or which are 
used in the production process can 
contain microbes. When 
introduced into the production 
process the microbes can establish 
and remain without new 
introductions. 
Risk assessment and microbiological 
quality control of all identified 
components used in the production. 
When the final product is sterilised, 
this is less relevant. 
Production facilities The facilities can be contaminated 
from any of the components, from 
personnel or other environmental 
factors during the production 
Risk assessment and microbiological 
quality control of all identified 
critical points. When the final 
product is not sterilised, 
microbiological quality control of the 
final product is warranted.  
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Area Problem Solutions 
Packing Packing material and 
environmental conditions (e.g. 
moisture) during the packing 
process may contaminate the outer 
surfaces. 
Risk assessment and microbiological 
quality control of the final, packed 
product. 
Transport and 
storage 
Packaging and products can be 
damaged and contaminated during 
transport and storage. 
Control of product and packing upon 
arrival and before use. Control of any 
product declarations and expiry 
dates. 
Use Devices can be contaminated 
during use, and whether it was 
sterile or not at commencement, 
bacterial growth can occur. 
Risk assessment of critical points. 
Implementation of preventive 
measures to reduce risk. Follow user 
guidelines. 
Reprocessing of 
reusable devices 
Errors can occur in any of the 
steps of cleaning, disinfection and 
sterilisation of reusable devices. 
Many devices can be difficult to 
reprocess due to ruffled surfaces, 
small lumina, unreachable inner 
areas etc.  
Follow detailed general and specific 
guidelines. Microbiological quality 
control after the finished process. 
Surveillance and tracking systems for 
the use of the devices. 
 
1.6.3. Outbreaks caused by medical devices  
A range of microbes can cause outbreaks in hospitals. When an association with medical 
devices or environmental reservoirs is described, often the bacteria in question are Gram-
negative water-prone bacteria (7, 35-73). Pseudomonas aeruginosa is often the causative 
agent of hospital outbreaks (35-73); other common bacterial sources are Serratia marcescens 
(65, 74-78), Acinetobacter baumannii and other Acinetobacter spp. (79-83), other species of 
Pseudomonas (84-87), Stenotrophomonas maltophilia (87, 88), Burkholderia cepacia (89-92), 
Klebsialla pneumonia (93) and enterococci (94).  
Medical devices can either introduce the causative bacterium of the outbreak or also maintain 
the outbreak due to wrongful use of the product or faulty cleaning and disinfection procedures 
between patients (35-37, 41, 43, 46, 54, 57, 64-67, 72, 78, 86, 87, 89, 95-98). In other 
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outbreaks personnel and environmental reservoirs are important (38, 45, 51, 59, 60, 62, 99). 
Cross-colonisation and cross-contamination within hospitals has been documented and can 
maintain outbreaks for longer periods (47, 52, 56, 59, 61, 63, 71, 74, 81-83, 93, 94, 100-102). 
Liquid or moist pharmaceuticals can cause or maintain outbreaks (37, 85, 89, 90, 103) as can 
moist cosmetics and water (35, 42, 67, 70, 84, 92, 99, 103, 104). Even transplanted organs can 
transmit bacteria like P. aeruginosa and cause an outbreak (58). 
Many outbreaks are linked to ICUs and ventilator treatment (35, 38, 42, 45, 47, 50, 53, 78-80, 
88, 96, 99). Pseudomonas aeruginosa is the most common gram-negative bacteria causing 
ventilator associated pneumonia (VAP) (105). Oropharyngeal colonisation is important for 
the development of VAP (106) and oral care may prevent pneumonia (107). For many of the 
outbreaks reported no definite source introducing the bacteria into the hospital has been 
verified. Nonetheless, the outbreaks have been brought to an end following the introduction or 
enforcement of strict infection control routines regarding personnel behaviour, standard 
precautions, cleaning, disinfection and sterilisation of medical devices, usage of only sterile or 
high-level disinfected moist products and thorough disinfection of all moist environmental 
surfaces (36-38, 41, 49-51, 53, 54, 59, 61-63, 65, 66, 70, 71, 74, 77-79, 82, 84, 86, 89-93, 95, 
96, 98, 99).  
1.7. Pseudomonas aeruginosa   
The name Pseudomonas meaning “false single units” was given to this group of bacteria 
when detected in the late 19th century in water. Aeruginosa means “copper rust” and denotes 
the blue-green pigment seen in laboratory cultures. 
1.7.1. Microbiology   
Pseudomonas aeruginosa is a gram-negative, non-spore-forming, rod-shaped bacterium with 
one polar flagellum. It is almost exclusively aerobic, have minimal nutritional requirements 
and can utilise carbon from a variety of sources. In the laboratory it is easily identifiable (4-6).  
P. aeruginosa produces several virulence factors. Polysaccharides and lipopolysaccharides 
serve as a barrier between the cell wall and the external environment and form a basis for the 
biofilm that the bacteria can produce. The bacteria also produce pigments that can act as 
virulence factors, and different exotoxins and proteases (5). In addition, P. aeruginosa 
produces several signal molecules, important for biofilm formation (108-112).  
Pseudomonas is naturally detected in a variety of environments like soil, water, plants and 
animals, including humans. The bacterium has a predilection for moist environments. 
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Consequently, in humans it is usually detected in moist areas like the ear, perineum and axilla. 
Likewise it is detected in moist areas of the hospital, like sinks, taps, mops, water containers, 
humid medical devices, medicines, food, and in any non-sterilised water. 
1.7.2. Epidemiology and clinical infection   
P. aeruginosa is often characterised as an opportunistic bacterium which denotes that it rarely 
causes infection in healthy humans but may do so following disruption of physical barriers 
and in patients with certain underlying illnesses. Outside the hospital setting, skin infections, 
especially after skin burns and external otitis in frequent swimmers are the most common 
clinical manifestations (4, 5, 7). 
In hospitals the clinical P. aeruginosa infection often reflects the patient’s underlying 
diseases. In addition to bacteraemia and endocarditis, infection of the urinary tract, respiratory 
tract, central nervous system, ear, eye, bone, joints and skin are most often reported (4, 5, 7, 
113, 114). Immunocompromised patients are vulnerable for infections in most body sites. 
Burns and disruption of the skin barrier can cause severe infections of the skin. Burn wound 
infections progressing to septicaemia are in ¾ of patients caused by P. aeruginosa and have a 
case fatality rate (CFR) of more than 50% (5). In patients receiving mechanical ventilation, 
other patients in ICUs and other patients with manipulation of airways Pseudomonas 
pneumonia is common. Patients with cystic fibrosis have an especially high risk for chronic 
colonisation and infection of the airways. Biofilm formation is an important factor in disease 
persistence for this patient group (115). Pseudomonas septicaemia and UTIs are also common 
clinical manifestations of P. aeruginosa infections. 
Pseudomonas species is ranked among the top ten causes of bacteraemias in hospitals (116-
121). In-hospital crude case-fatality from invasive disease is high, ranging from 18% to 61% 
(113, 122-132). In a Norwegian single-hospital study of bacteraemia in patients with 
malignant blood diseases, P. aeruginosa ranks number five in frequency as causative agent 
and these patients had a CFR of 21% within 30 days after bacteraemia diagnosis (133). 
Pseudomonas species other than Pseudomonas aeruginosa infrequently cause infection (6). 
1.8. Biofilm formation   
Bacteria exhibit two distinct modes of behaviour, a planktonic mode with free floating single 
bacteria and as a biofilm where the bacteria appear as structured communities (108, 111, 134). 
Most of our knowledge about bacteria stem from studies on planktonic bacteria. Studies in 
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recent years indicate that biofilm is an important – if not the most important – mode that 
bacteria appear in.  
P. aeruginosa is well known to form biofilms (111, 134, 135). Biofilms are structured, 
specialised communities of adherent microorganisms encased in a complex extrapolymeric 
substance matrix (134) which can form on any surface although some surfaces are known to 
retard adherence (111). When a biofilm is formed and reaches a critical mass the quorum 
sensing molecules excreted alter many of the functions of the bacteria, including slowing its 
metabolism and increasing the production of a glycocalyx matrix (108, 112). These and other 
factors reduces the bacteria’s susceptibility to antibiotics and disinfectants (111, 135). It has 
been shown that P. aeruginosa can reappear after biofilms on polyvinylchloride pipes have 
been exposed to a variety of disinfectants for seven days (136). To eradicate the viable 
bacteria in a biofilm, heat is preferred. Alternatively mechanical removal or the use of 
oxidative biocides to slowly dissolve the biofilm matrix (135) are suggested. Once a biofilm 
has formed and matured it can spread to new locations either through single cell dispersal or 
the shedding of clumps of biofilm (111, 112, 134). 
1.9. Molecular typing methods   
In epidemiology and outbreak investigation support from microbiological investigations often 
is essential in order to delimit an outbreak and determine who is a case and who is not. It is 
not sufficient to be able to identify Pseudomonas spp. or Salmonella enteritidis in patients to 
determine whether they are part of the same outbreak. More specific methods are needed. 
This is similar to criminal investigations by the police where different so-called fingerprint 
methods are used to link persons to locations. 
In classical microbiology phenotypical and serotypical methods are used to differentiate 
between bacteria of the same species. Most of these methods are technologically simple and 
the results easy to compare between laboratories, but the methods are time consuming due to 
much manual work. Bacteria can further be differentiated on the presence of toxins and 
virulence factors and on antibiotic resistance patterns (5, 6). 
The genome of bacteria has certain areas that are conserved within a species and certain areas 
that show different degrees of variability. The degree of variability varies considerably 
between bacterial species. To be able to distinguish between bacteria one needs to identify 
areas of the bacterial genome that are sufficiently variable to be able to discriminate between 
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clones, but not too variable so all bacteria appears different. The different molecular typing 
methods are developed to fit the specific properties of the different bacteria. 
There is a whole array of molecular typing methods used for bacteria. All are based on the 
same principle, which is to identify and extract specific areas of the bacterial genome, amplify 
them and display them in ways to be able to compare the different bacterial samples. 
For Pseudomonas aeruginosa mainly two molecular typing methods were used in the period 
when the Dent-O-Sept outbreak occurred. One is called pulsed-field gel electrophoresis 
(PFGE) where the bacterial genome is amplified, cut and spread in an agar by an electric field 
creating bands of different sizes in a specific pattern (137). By visually comparing, one can 
determine the degree of similarity between isolates. Due to uncontrollable differences in the 
processing between laboratories, it is not advisable to compare results between different 
laboratories. Another disadvantage of the method is that it is labour-intensive. 
The other method commonly used is amplified fragment length polymorphism (AFLP). AFLP 
uses restriction enzymes to cut genomic DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid), followed by ligation 
of complementary double stranded adaptors to the ends of the restriction fragments. A subset 
of the restriction fragments are then amplified using two primers complementary to the 
adaptor and restriction site fragments. The fragments are visualised on denaturing 
polyacrylamide gels either through autoradiography or fluorescence methodologies (38, 101, 
138, 139) . 
In investigations of hospital outbreaks different molecular typing techniques are commonly 
used to distinguish cases from non-cases. The first challenge is to identify the best typing 
method for the microbe in question. Another is to define the genotypical criteria for including 
and excluding a bacterial isolate among the cases. There may be some variability among the 
bacteria at the onset of the outbreak and the bacteria may change during the course of the 
outbreak due to random mutations, antibiotic pressure, transfers of plasmids between bacteria 
etc. Most of the outbreaks referred to in chapter 1.6.3 have used one or more molecular typing 
methods to define the cases belonging to the outbreak and to link the cases to sources among 
medical devices, other equipment, the environment and personnel. 
1.10. Causality   
In complex situations many factors influence each other and it is rare to find simple cause-
effect episodes like “the person died (effect) because he was shot through the heart (cause)”. 
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There is a definite association between smoking and lung cancer, but not a one-to-one 
relationship. Not all smokers contract lung cancer and not all with lung cancer have smoked.  
The philosophical basis of the dominant approach for testing theories in medicine is the 
hypothetico-deductive model as described by for example David Hume and Karl Popper. 
According to this model it is impossible to achieve absolute proof for a scientific hypothesis; 
tests performed can only corroborate or falsify the hypothesis. Consequently one can never 
prove causality between factors and an outcome, only strengthen or weaken a proposed 
association. In this tradition, Sir Austin Bradford Hill listed nine viewpoints from which to 
study the association of two variables in order to claim causation (140). 
Classic epidemiology has been mainly backward looking, seeking an explanation to an event. 
In much of the 19th century there was a profound debate on what caused many of the major 
diseases of the time, being it miasmata (stench or bad air) or contagions (141). For a disease 
like cholera, John Snow, the father of epidemiology, was in favour of the theory of a 
contagion which he called ”morbid matter” (142). Late in the 19th century, a prominent 
German microbiologist, Robert Koch, formulated a set of postulates that needed to be fulfilled 
in order to claim that a micro-organism caused a specific disease (143, 144). According to his 
postulates we need both necessary and the sufficient conditions to claim causal relationship 
between a microbe and a disease. 
1.10.1. Counterfactual theories 
A century later MacMahon stated that there are two ways of classifying ill persons, either by 
manifestational criteria (grouping ill persons according to symptoms or clinical signs, e.g. 
common cold, schizophrenia or meningitis) or by causal criteria (grouping ill persons with 
respect to a specified experience believed to be a cause of their illness, e.g. lead poisoning or 
meningococcal disease) (145). To have a Pseudomonas aeruginosa infection implies by name 
and definition causality of the bacterium.  
The central question in counterfactual theories of causation is “What would have happened if 
not event c had happened?” And the answer is: “If not event c had occurred, then the event e 
would not have occurred” (146). Counterfactual reasoning can be used both in deterministic 
and probabilistic models. In daily life and in medicine counterfactual reasoning is extensively 
used. “If the needle hadn’t been contaminated, the patient would not have acquired hepatitis.” 
“If you hadn’t been exposed to asbestos, you would not have contracted mesothelioma.” “If 
the producer had adhered to the regulations, the outbreak would not have occurred.” Many of 
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the epidemiological study designs have counterfactual thinking embodied (147). In cohort 
studies we compare exposed and unexposed individuals for a certain risk factor. The 
unexposed group can be viewed as “what if this exposure did not occur”. When calculating 
the attributable risk fraction, also called the etiological fraction, we assume that all association 
between the exposure studied and the outcome is causal, and in addition imply that if not the 
exposed group had been exposed, the rate of outcome among them would have been at the 
same level as among the unexposed. 
1.10.2. Determinism and probabilism   
Determinism is based on the idea that that every event is necessitated by antecedent events 
and conditions together with the laws of nature (148). According to causal determinism the 
causal relationships are invariant: Every time a certain configuration of conditions occurs, the 
outcome will be the same. We may have causal determinism even if the situation is complex 
and the outcome is hard to predict. Probabilistic causality on the other hand claims that the 
causal relationship is probabilistic, and not invariant. That is, the outcome (effect) may vary 
according to probability distribution. Probabilistic theories of causation state that causes raise 
the probabilities of their effects (149).  
In epidemiology, probabilistic approaches are most often used in the conceptual thinking of a 
relationship and in the statistical testing of the strength of association (149). Here, Hill’s set of 
nine viewpoints to explain the association between two variables are commonly used (140). 
Only the one of temporal sequence of association is essential. This list of “Guidelines for 
causation” is more in tune with modern epidemiological science as they emphasise the 
strength of association rather than pure mechanical determinism. However, many have 
criticised Hill’s list and in recent years there has been a resurge in the debate about causality 
(150-154). Often in communicable disease epidemiology, including outbreak investigation, it 
is useful to apply Hill’s nine viewpoints to assess association. However, with the advent of 
modern microbiological methods where one can detect genotypically identical strains of a 
bacterium in different locations and thereby more or less confirm the association, the other 
viewpoints play a lesser role.  
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2. Background and outline of thesis   
2.1. Background about the outbreak   
In late February 2002, the NIPH was alerted to a possible increase in the number of 
Pseudomonas infections in the clinical wards of Norwegian hospitals, especially in ICUs 
(Table 3). Infection control personnel in different hospitals had vague impressions of seeing 
more Pseudomonas infections than normal. On 8 March 2002, investigators at St. Olavs 
Hospital in Trondheim, Norway, discovered genotypically identical strains of P. aeruginosa in 
patient samples from two hospitals in different regions, and 10 days later, they discovered a 
genotypically identical strain from a third hospital in yet another region. We launched a 
national outbreak investigation. In retrospect we have created a timeline or log over the main 
events: 
Table 3. Time-line of the main events in the Dent-O-Sept case. 
 
Time Event 
1977 or 
1978 
Production of the Dent-O-Sept swab started 
1995 New regulations on medical devices made legal for Norway. In 
order to CE mark a medical device, the producer needs to make a 
declaration of conformity. 
1999 External evaluation of the production of the Dent-O-Sept swabs 
after complaints about discoloured swabs. The producer complied 
with some, but not all of the recommendations. 
10.04.2000 The producer was certified by an independent body according to the 
standard NS-EN ISO 9002, 1994. 
20.11.2000 The first patient with the P. aeruginosa later to be indetified as the 
outbreak strain was tested. 
12.04.2001 The first patient with P. aeruginosa later to be identified as the 
outbreak strain in blood culture was tested. 
17.09.2001 The first swab to be detected contaminated with the outbreak strain 
was produced this week. 
01.11.2001 A rapid increase in new cases with the outbreak strain started. 
Nov. 2001 Some clinicians in hospitals started to question whether they were 
seeing an increase in Pseudomonas infections, especially in ICUs.  
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Time Event 
27.02.2002 Telephone from a doctor at the hospital in Stavanger to NIPH where 
she told us about a perceived increase in Pseudomonas infections 
and requested us to enquire other hospitals about it. 
28.02.2002 E-mail from NIPH to all regional centres in hospital infection 
control and prevention where we ask whether they have noticed an 
increase. Quick preliminary answers from most regions. 
08.03.2002 St. Olavs Hospital in Trondheim detected genotypically identical 
strains of P. aeruginosa in hospitalised patients from Stavanger and 
Trondheim. 
12.03.2002 General alert of possible outbreak in MSIS-rapport, a newsletter 
from Norwegian Institute of Public Health. 
18.03.2002 The outbreak strain detected in a third hospital, Ullevål in Oslo. 
21.03.2002 The outbreak strain detected in a fourth hospital, Ahus, outside Oslo. 
21.03.2002 Trawling questionnaire sent to all hospitals with patients with the 
outbreak strain. 
02.04.2002 Telephone from the infection control nurse at Feiringklinikken. 
They had sent a discoloured Dent-O-Sept mouth swab for 
microbiological analysis and Pseudomonas sp. was detected. The 
lab had discarded the culture. 
03.04.2002 E-mail sent to all involved hospitals to check the Dent-O-Sept 
swabs. 
08.04.2002 At 5.18 PM, mail from St. Olavs Hospital: A genotypically identical 
strain of Pseudomonas aeruginosa was detected in Dent-O-Sept 
swab produced week 47 in 2001. 
09.04.2002 All relevant parties were notified. A press conference was held. 
Large media attention. Production of the Dent-O-Sept swab ceased 
permanently.  
10.04.2002 The Directorate for Health and Social Affairs asked orally NIPH to 
perform a mapping of all aspects of the outbreak. 
12..04.2002 The Directorate for Health and Social Affairs organised a system 
audit of the manufacturer. 
The police started an investigation of the producer.  
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Time Event 
25.04.2002 The minister of Health gave an orientation on the outbreak of 
Pseudomonas infections in the parliament. 
14.06.2002 The Norwegian Board of Health asked NIPH formally and 
specifically to perform a mapping of the total extent of the outbreak. 
28.06.2002 NIPH sent formal letters to all medical microbiological laboratories 
about the outbreak mapping. 
02.09.2002 The police had finished the investigation of the producer and 
decided not to press charges and closed the case. 
01.10.2002 Internal review report by the Ministry of health on the roles and 
responsibilities of the central health administration in the fields of 
medical devices, discrepancy report systems and infection control 
09.12.2002 The Directorate for Health and Social Affairs appealed the police’s 
decision not to press charges. The time limit for this kind of appeals 
is three weeks; hence the Attorney-General could not reopen the 
case.  
21.08.2003 Preliminary report from NIPH on the outbreak investigations of 
patients. 
17.01.2004 Final reports from NIPH, The Directorate for Health and Social 
Affairs and The Norwegian Board of Health. 
18.02.2004 Status report from The Norwegian System for Compensation to 
Patients on the monetary claims and their assessment. 
11.10.2005 Out-of-court settlement where the producer agrees to pay The 
Norwegian System for Compensation to Patients 1.2 million NOK 
without accepting any responsibility for the outbreak. 
19.06.2006 Court settlement between the producer and one large hospital 
(Ullevål) where the hospital received a compensation of 3.3 million 
NOK for additional costs incurred. 
2.2. Setting   
Norway had a population of 4.5 million people in 2001-2002 and approximately 65 (mainly 
public) hospitals organised in 5 public regional health trusts, each of which had a centre for 
hospital infection control. The 22 medical microbiological laboratories in the country 
provided general bacteriological culturing services. There was no national surveillance system 
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for P. aeruginosa infection. There were around 1000 health care institutions for the elderly. 
Through the European Economic Area Agreement Norway abides by much of the legislation 
within the EU, including European Council Directive 93/42/EEC concerning medical devices 
(26).  
The main data for this study was collected in 2002-2003 during and after an outbreak of P. 
aeruginosa infection in hospitals. 
Most of the research for this study took place at the NIPH during and after the outbreak 
investigation. NIPH is a governmental non-regulatory institute mandated to conduct 
surveillance of infectious diseases (epidemiologically and microbiologically) and advice the 
health services and the public on prevention and control of infectious diseases. As with other 
outbreak investigations NIPH collaborated extensively with all affected parties: infection 
control teams and administration in the hospitals, the regional health trusts’ centres for 
hospital infection control, the medical microbiological laboratories, the local Food Safety 
Authority, some nursing homes and municipal medical officers, some private persons, the 
national and county Board of Health, the Directorate of Health and Social Affairs and the 
Department of Health. 
2.3. Outline of the thesis  
In Chapter 1 I give a general introduction, high-lighting some of the special features of HAIs 
and outbreak investigation in a hospital setting, medical devices, the bacterium under study 
and also give a general introduction to the discourse on causality in epidemiology which 
became important in the public debate of the outbreak.  
In Chapter 3 I list the aims of the study and in Chapter 4 I present the data sources and 
methods used. The main results are presented in Chapter 5. And in Chapter 6 the findings are 
discussed and strengths, weaknesses and limitations of the methodology used are put under 
scrutiny. Finally, in Chapter 7 I reiterate the main conclusions, suggest further studies and 
propose what actions that should be taken from the lessons learned. 
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3. Aims of the thesis   
All parts of this thesis are in some ways related to a large outbreak of Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa infection in Norwegian hospitals that occurred in 2001-2002. 
The overall aims were to investigate a large outbreak of Pseudomonas infections and gain 
knowledge from it, to explore theories for causality and responsibility, and to describe the 
epidemiology and investigate risk factors for contracting invasive Pseudomonas aeruginosa 
infection. 
When an infectious disease outbreak of this size occurs in hospitals large resources are spent 
on the outbreak investigation. In addition, experience is gained and knowledge is acquired in 
many related areas. The organisational structure and information channels are tested, as are 
the guidelines and regulations, the behaviours and routines, and the ability of all parties 
involved to respond to the emergency occurring.  
3.1. Investigating an outbreak of Pseudomonas aeruginosa infections 
When an outbreak occurs the overriding goal is to stop the outbreak to minimise the damage. 
The specific aims were to 
• describe the outbreak,  
• identify risk factors for contracting the disease among the patients,  
• identify the causes of the outbreak, and  
• make recommendations for the prevention of future outbreaks. 
3.2. Investigating contamination of the medical device   
When the outbreak strain of P. aeruginosa was detected in a medical device, it was concluded 
that this device was the vehicle introducing the bacterium into the hospitals. All aspects of 
this device, its production and use, was explored and assessed. The specific aims of this part 
of the investigation were to 
• examine how Pseudomonas aeruginosa contaminated the product,  
• assess the extent of the contamination by P. aeruginosa and other microbes, and  
• identify critical points in the production process that made the contamination possible. 
3.3. Exploring theories for causality of an outbreak of Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa infections   
The outbreak received heavy mass media attention at times. Many patients had fallen ill, 
many died while hospitalised. In the public debate differences of opinion among stakeholders 
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were visible, politicians took part (an orientation was given in the parliament), large 
economical resources and even work places were at stake.  
With all these actors and acts and different agendas, it was difficult to see who did what and 
which role and responsibility each participant had. The literature on causality is plentiful and 
diverse. The specific aims were to 
• examine theories of causality from different fields like science, philosophy and law, 
• apply the theories on the various participants in the outbreak to examine their role, and  
• discuss the responsibility and fallibility for two of the main actors.  
3.4. Investigating the epidemiology of invasive Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa infection   
Pseudomonas aeruginosa can cause serious disease in susceptible patients even when there is 
no outbreak. Pseudomonas species is ranked among the top ten causes of bacteraemia in 
hospitals (116-121). In-hospital crude case-fatality from invasive disease is high, ranging 
from 18% to 61% (113, 122-132). There is extensive knowledge on P. aeruginosa infections 
in general and especially from tertiary care hospitals. But little is known about the 
epidemiology of invasive P. aeruginosa infection in humans in unselected hospitals, and even 
less from Norway as these infections are not covered by any national surveillance systems. 
The specific aims of this part of the study were to  
• describe the epidemiology of invasive P. aeruginosa infection in Norway,  
• identify patient groups at increased risk of disease and of death from P. aeruginosa 
infection, and  
• estimate national incidence rates and mortality rates of P. aeruginosa infections by groups 
of underlying diseases. 
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4. Materials and methods  
4.1. Investigating an outbreak of Pseudomonas aeruginosa infections   
Following the alert of a possible increase, the NIPH immediately launched a classical 
outbreak investigation as outlined in Chapter 2.4: Infection control personnel in hospitals 
were alerted, preliminary epidemiological and microbiological investigations were performed, 
environmental sampling were performed, preliminary, and later definite case definitions were 
made. When the outbreak strain of P. aeruginosa was found in a product, systematic sampling 
of all available batches of the product was carried out. The production plant was inspected 
and sampled.  
The Ministry of Health and its subordinate institutions, the Norwegian Board of Health and 
the Directorate for Health and Social Affairs, requested the detection of all patients involved 
in the outbreak. A systematic protocol was developed and approved. The outbreak strain of P. 
aeruginosa was identified. All available clinical, bacterial isolates were genotyped and 
compared with the outbreak strain. For each patient with the outbreak strain or with another 
strain of P. aeruginosa isolated from blood or CSF samples, the patient’s physician were 
asked to fill in a detailed questionnaire.  
We conducted a case-control study to investigate risk factors for having the outbreak strain of 
P. aeruginosa as compared with other strains of P. aeruginosa. We did not look for risk 
factors for having P. aeruginosa infection. Data obtained in the descriptive epidemiological 
investigation was used. To be able to pick comparable controls the source population was 
defined as only those with invasive P. aeruginosa infection. Case patients were persons with 
the outbreak strain isolated from blood or CSF samples during the period October 2001–
December 2002, and control subjects were all the persons included in the study with 
genotyped strains of P. aeruginosa other than the outbreak strain isolated from blood or CSF 
samples during the same period.  
To investigate risk factors for a fatal outcome during the stay in the institution for patients 
with an invasive Pseudomonas infection, we used a cohort design including all of the patients 
in the case-control study. The same variables as in the case-control study were included as 
possible risk factors for death, in addition to having the outbreak strain. 
To evaluate whether the Pseudomonas infection had contributed to the death of individual 
patients, Bjørn G. Iversen and Preben Aavitsland meticulously assessed all of the available 
information for each of the dead patients. Among the information assessed was the course of 
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events for each patient, dates for hospital admission, diagnosis, transfers and death, 
underlying illnesses, clinical and microbiological information and the clinicians’ assessment 
of a relationship between P. aeruginosa infection and death. Due to a large degree of 
variability between how the different clinicians assessed the relationship, we did not follow 
their assessments in all instances.  
4.2. Investigating contamination of the medical device   
Detailed environmental investigations were carried out for the product, the production facility 
and for the moist ingredients of the product. 
When the outbreak strain of P. aeruginosa was found in a product, systematic sampling of all 
available batches of the product was carried out. Up to 10 items of each available batch of the 
product were asked to be examined. We asked the laboratories to identify and deep freeze 
monocultures of all findings of certain microbes whereas others were only to be noted and 
reported. 
The Directorate for Health and Social Affairs organised a system audit of the manufacturer on 
12 – 15 April 2002 by studying documents, interviewing selected personnel and inspecting 
the premises, including microbiological sampling which were cultured at the municipal Food 
Control Authority. On request from the producer, the laboratory at the municipal Food 
Control Authority performed environmental sampling in addition to what had been performed 
during the system audit. 
Microbiological analysis (155, 156) were performed on each of the ingredients for the 
moisturising liquid used in the product (except tap water). The total viable aerobic count and 
specific detection of P. aeruginosa were tested in each of the liquids. Then the moisturising 
liquid undiluted and in 1:10 dilution were tested for their effect on the outbreak strain and a 
reference strain of P. aeruginosa (ATCC 9027 -MicroBioLogics) (157).  
4.3. Exploring theories for causality of an outbreak of Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa infections   
An analytical approach in the tradition of philosophy of science, and not using a strict 
epidemiological methodology, was used to discuss causality in the outbreak. Firstly, theories 
of causality from different disciplines were introduced. Then the P. aeruginosa outbreak was 
used as a case and the different theories were applied. The different theories of causality were 
put under scrutiny and the roles of the many actors involved were elucidated. Two actors are 
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especially central in this outbreak and their roles were further discussed to examine their 
responsibility and fallibility in the outbreak. 
4.4. Investigating the epidemiology of invasive Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa infection   
We used all information on patients with P. aeruginosa or Pseudomonas not identified at the 
species level (Pseudomonas spp.) isolated from blood or CSF during the period 1992-2002 
collected during the outbreak investigation. We described the whole cohort and we analysed 
in detail the patients from the recent years (1999-2002), about whom we had collected much 
more information. Denominator data was collected from a variety of public sources. 
Population statistics and the number of beds in municipal nursing homes were downloaded 
from Statistics Norway. The number of stays and the number of days of hospitalisation in 
somatic hospitals by region, age and discharge diagnoses were supplied by The Norwegian 
Patient Register. Several disease categories that have been shown to be associated with 
increased risk of invasive P. aeruginosa infection were selected and grouped according to 
ICD-10 (International Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision) (158).  
Descriptive and analytical epidemiological methods were used, and incidence proportions of 
infection and death for various groups were calculated.  
4.5. Data management and statistical analysis   
In the data collection, extensive efforts were made to ensure completeness and quality checks 
of data. Participating microbiological laboratories were given lists of all information they had 
sent NIPH to check for completeness of records and to fill in missing values and to correct 
improbable values. Hospitals were contacted by mail and phone to remind them of missing 
clinical forms and to check missing or improbable values and unreadable text. 
Data were checked manually and electronically by listings, cross tabulations and by 
calculating time between admission, diagnosis, discharge and death. Some patients had been 
admitted to more than one hospital, and double entries were checked and removed. All 
patients were checked with an updated National Population Registry to search for deaths.  
Paper I 
All data were entered into an Epi Info software database, version 6.04d (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention), and analysed data using Epi Info (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention) and Stata 8 (Stata) statistical software. For the case-control study, odds ratios 
(ORs), 95% confidence intervals (CIs), and P values were calculated. In the multivariable 
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logistic regression analysis, all risk factors were initially included in the model, and the ones 
with the highest P values were removed one by one, until only variables with P values <0.05 
remained. The variables that remained in the model were assessed and statistically tested for 
effect modification. In the cohort study examining risk factors for death, a similar binary 
regression approach was used. 
Paper IV 
We entered all patient data in an Epi Info version 6.04d database and analysed them in Epi 
Info, Excel, Episheet and Stata 8 and 9 statistical software. Incidence proportions, incidence 
rates and a comparison of these (risk ratios and rate ratios of different kinds) with 95% CIs 
were calculated in Episheet and Stata. To identify risk factors for dying among the cases we 
performed stepwise multivariable binomial regression analyses in Stata. 
 
4.6. Laboratory analysis   
Primary culturing of product and patient samples was performed at local laboratories. 
Culturing of samples of the product was performed at local laboratories according to our 
instruction: “Brush the swab against both a lactose and blood agar dish in a rotating manner 
so all sides of the foam tip touches the agar. It is not necessary to place the swab in a growth 
broth”. The isolates were identified by standard procedures in use by the laboratories. 
Culturing of samples from the system audit and the additional investigation of the production 
site were performed at the laboratory of the municipal Food Control Authority. The 
qualitative analysis of the samples was performed by direct seeding (except for dry Dent-O-
Sept swabs) and seeding after enrichment overnight in a heart infusion broth on Kings Agar B 
and on blood agar. The quantitative analysis was performed by direct seeding of 0.1 mL 
undiluted or – if heavy contamination was expected – diluted liquid on Kings Agar B and for 
some samples also on blood agar. The plates were incubated at 37°C overnight before 
reading. 
All available isolates of P. aeruginosa from patients, product and from the system audit (but 
not from the additional investigations of the production site) were sent to at least one of five 
reference laboratories for genotyping and comparison with the outbreak strain (P. aeruginosa 
found in the product batch 47.2001 on 8 April 2002). The reference laboratories reported 
whether the isolate belonged to the outbreak strain or not. Four of the reference laboratories 
used a protocol developed at St. Olavs Hospital for a PFGE method. The criteria of Tenover 
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et al. (137) were used to interpret identical (no band differences) or closely related (3 band 
differences) isolates. The fifth laboratory used an AFLP method. The method for genotyping 
by AFLP is slightly modified from a method described elsewhere (38). Isolates that displayed 
85% similarity were considered to be closely genetically related and to belong to the same 
clone. 
The AFLP and PFGE protocols were compared and found to be equal in detecting and 
discriminating the outbreak strain. If an isolate was not typeable by PFGE because of 
excessive activity of endogenous endonucleases, it was genotyped with AFLP. 
4.7. Ethics   
All public health work has to balance between the rights of the individual and the benefits for 
society. This is particularly evident in prevention and control of communicable diseases. A 
person with a communicable disease can have his freedoms restricted in order to protect the 
society at large. For example, a person with open pulmonary tuberculosis needs to be 
confined to an isolation room as long as he is contagious to prevent further spread, preferably 
voluntarily, if necessary by force. The Norwegian Communicable disease control act is build 
up around these principles (23). There was no need to isolate any patients with P. aeruginosa 
by force.  
One regulation to this act is on the surveillance of communicable diseases and immediate 
notification of serious events and outbreaks. The immediate outbreak notifications shall not 
contain person identifiable information. When conducting an outbreak investigation it 
sometimes is necessary to obtain confidential information quickly in order to control the 
outbreak and minimise the harm and where seeking approval may seriously delay the 
investigation. This is acceptable and in accordance with consequentialistical ethical thinking. 
The National Committee for Research Ethics in Norway concludes that prior approval is not 
needed as long as the objective is to control the outbreak (159). Then it is also in accordance 
with deontological ethics. 
When the outbreak investigation moves beyond the need to control the outbreak, further 
approval is needed, hence the NIPH was authorised by the Norwegian Board of Health to 
perform the study. And the Data Inspectorate gave permission to create a database to store the 
information.  
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5. Synopsis of the results of the study  
5.1. Investigating an outbreak of Pseudomonas aeruginosa infections   
The outbreak strain of P. aeruginosa was isolated from 231 patients from November 2000 
through December 2002, with a peak incidence during February–March 2002 (Figure 3). The 
patients with the outbreak strain were hospitalised at 24 different hospitals in all public 
regional health trusts (range, 1– 39 patients per hospital), whereas 5 lived in other institutions, 
and 3 were not hospitalised when they received a diagnosis. The median age was 65 years and 
61% were men. Of the 231 patients 39 had positive blood culture results. Clinically 42 had 
sepsis, and 87 had pneumonia, whereas 70 patients were only colonised. Altogether, 156 
patients were admitted to an ICU during their hospital stay, and 128 received mechanical 
ventilation within the previous 3 weeks before receiving a diagnosis of Pseudomonas 
infection. 
Figure 3. Epidemic curve of the outbreak showing the number of patients cases with the 
outbreak strain of Pseudomonas aeruginosa isolated from either blood or CSF sample or 
other sites, by month and year of the first positive culture result. 
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Seventy-one patients (31%) died while institutionalised; all of the patients who died had 
severe underlying disease. An assessment of whether the Pseudomonas infection contributed 
to the patient’s death concluded that it was probable for 34 patients, improbable for 21, 
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uncertain for 13, and impossible to evaluate because of a lack of information for 3. A total of 
132 patients (69%) with the outbreak strain had definitely or probably used the Dent-O-Sept 
swab, whereas 58 (31%) had not or probably had not used it. 
Among 39 case patients and 159 control subjects, use of the moist mouth swab (adjusted OR 
5.3; 95% CI 2.0–13.6) and receipt of mechanical ventilation (adjusted OR 6.4; 95% CI 2.3–
17.2) were associated with infection due to the outbreak strain.  
5.2. Investigating contamination of the medical device   
NIPH received information about stored batches of the Dent-O-Sept swab from 59 general 
hospitals, four other health care services and 20 private persons. A total of 1565 swabs were 
examined from 149 different batches. Although we asked for up to 10 swabs of each batch to 
be examined, an average of 18 swabs per available batch were examined for the years 2001 
and 2002, ranging from one to 37 swabs per batch. The outbreak strain of P. aeruginosa was 
detected in 76 swabs from 12 different batches of the Dent-O-Sept swab produced from week 
38 in 2001 to week 15 in 2002 when production ceased. All genotyped strains of P. 
aeruginosa were identical to the outbreak strain. In total, more than 250 swabs were found to 
contain one or more species of microorganisms, mainly gram-positive bacteria which were 
predominantly discovered in the earlier batches. Gram-negative rods including Acinetobacter 
baumanii were isolated in swabs produced in 1999 and 2001. 
During the system audit and the additional investigations of the production facilities samples 
for microbiological examinations were taken from several places along the production line. 
The outbreak strain of P. aeruginosa was detected from the end capillary nozzle in the 
packing machine (Figure 4). In the additional investigation P. aeruginosa (which were not 
genotyped) were cultured from the blue connecting pipe, the level measuring device and a 
rubber hose.  
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Figure 4. Schematic figure showing the wet part of the production of the Dent-O-Sept swab. 
End capillary
nozzle in
packing
machine
Pipe to
packing
machineLevel measuring
device
Tank
Outlet Pump
Dosing
valve
Rubber
hose
Blue connecting
pipe
 
 
The system audit concluded that the production deviated from the existing regulations in 
several areas: 
• The production process, including the recipe for Dent- O-Sept, did not ensure that the 
product had the qualities and properties stated by the producer nor that the risk of 
contamination was avoided or reduced to a minimum. 
• Neither the boxes nor wraps of the Dent-O-Sept gave the user the necessary information. 
The CE (Communauté Européenne) marking was unjust because the producer’s 
declaration of conformity with the regulations, including the risk analysis, was poorly 
based and documented. The technical documentation did not give a third party a basis for 
assessing whether the device was in accordance with the demands of the regulations. 
• The producer did not comply with the obligation to report defects and deficiencies in 
medical devices to national health officials and had not adequately followed up errors in 
the production demonstrated in an external review in 1999. 
 
No bacteria were detected in any of the ingredients for the moisturising liquid. When the 
outbreak strain of P. aeruginosa was added to the Dent-O-Sept solution and to the two 
concentrations of the disinfectant we observed a 6 log reduction in 15 minutes and for the 
1:10 diluted Dent-O-Sept solution a 6 log reduction after 3-6 hours. For the reference strain 
(ATCC 9027) there was a 6 log reduction in 15 minutes for all four liquids. 
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5.3. Exploring theories for causality of an outbreak of Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa infections   
The P. aeruginosa outbreak was used as a case and various theories of causality from 
different disciplines (epidemiology, other sciences, philosophy and law) were applied to 
discuss the roles and responsibilities of some of the parties involved. Mackie’s concept of 
INUS conditions, Hill’s nine viewpoints to study association for claiming causation, 
deterministic and probabilistic ways of reasoning, all shed light on the issues of causality in 
this outbreak. Moreover, applying legal theories of causation (counterfactual reasoning and 
the “but-for” test and the NESS test) proved especially useful, but the case also illustrated the 
weaknesses of the various theories of causation. 
We concluded that many factors contributed to causing the outbreak, but that contamination 
of a medical device in the production facility was the major necessary condition. The reuse of 
the medical device in hospitals primarily contributed to the size of the outbreak. The 
unintended error by its producer – and to a minor extent by the hospital practice – was mainly 
due to non-application of relevant knowledge and skills, and appears to constitute 
professional negligence. Due to criminal procedure laws and other factors outside the 
discourse of causality, no one was criminally charged for the outbreak  
5.4. Investigating the epidemiology of invasive Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa infection   
In the 11 year period 1992-2002, 1174 patients with invasive disease were identified, of 
which 1079 (92%) had isolates of P. aeruginosa and 95 had Pseudomonas not identified at 
the species level (Pseudomonas spp.), resulting in an overall incidence rate of 2.43 per 
100 000 person-years at risk (pyar) (Figure 5). The median age of the patients was 72 years 
and 67% were male. 
For the period 1999-2002, 567 incident cases (representing 565 patients) were identified, 
corresponding to an incidence rate of 3.16 per 100 000 pyar (95% CI, 2.90-3.43). In hospitals 
the incidence rate was 3.33 per 100 000 person-days (95% CI, 3.06-3.62), or 0.20 per 1000 
hospital stays (95% CI, 0.18-0.21). 
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Figure 5. The monthly number of cases of invasive Pseudomonas aeruginosa infection in 
Norway 1992-2002. Forty cases (white bars) belonged to an outbreak caused by a 
contaminated mouth swab. 
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The rate of infection was much higher in males, 5.1 per 100 000 person-days in hospital as 
compared with 1.9 in females (incidence rate ratio [IRR], 2.6; 95% CI, 2.2-3.1). For hospital-
acquired cases the rates were 2.9 and 1.0 per 100 000, respectively (IRR, 3.0; 95% CI, 2.3-
3.8). 
A total of 55% of the cases were hospital-acquired and an additional 10% were living in or 
being hospitalised from a nursing home. The remaining 34% were community-acquired and 
1% was unknown. For hospital-acquired infection the rate was 671 per 100 000 person-years 
as compared with 1.13 for community-acquired infection, and 37 in nursing homes.  
Of the patients with invasive P. aeruginosa infection, 14% received mechanical ventilation 
within a period of 3 weeks before the sample positive for P. aeruginosa was taken, and 30% 
were admitted to an ICU during their stay in the hospital. 
The highest risk for invasive P. aeruginosa disease was found in patients with malignant 
neoplasms of lymphoid and hematopoietic tissue (ICD-10 categories C81–C96) (risk per 1000 
hospital stays 1.9; 95% CI 1.5-2.3) and other diseases of blood and blood-forming organs 
(D70–D77) (2.2; 95% CI 1.2-3.7). The CFR was 35%. The highest CFR was seen among 
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patients with transplanted organs (Z94) (67%) and patients with certain diseases of the 
respiratory system (J10–J22; J40–J96) (52%).  
In the multivariable regression analysis, the following variables were independently 
associated with an increased risk of dying (CFR) while hospitalised among the cases: Having 
one or more underlying risk diagnoses (risk ratio [RR], 2.52; 95% CI, 1.50-4.25), admission 
to an ICU at some time during the stay (RR 1.55; 95% CI, 1.26-1.91), being 60 years or older 
(RR, 1.53; 95% CI, 1.14-2.06), and having received immunosuppressive treatment within the 
past three weeks before the sample with P. aeruginosa was taken (RR, 1.39; 95% CI, 1.13-
1.73). Having a Pseudomonas UTI as the most serious clinical Pseudomonas diagnosis was 
highly protective (RR 0.09; 95% CI, 0.01-0.63). 
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6. Discussion   
The outbreak of Pseudomonas aeruginosa infection in 2001-2002 was a major wake-up call 
for many groups in the society, including hospital managers, hospital infection control 
personnel, national health service administration, politicians in the parliament and elsewhere 
and producers of medical devices. Prior to the outbreak few would have believed that a 
seemingly inconspicuous mouth swab which had been produced for decades, could have 
caused serious disease in so many patients. 
The outbreak reminds us of the change in the patient population in hospitals over the last 
decades with an increasingly larger part being severely ill and susceptible for an increasing 
number of opportunistic bacteria. Consequently infection control becomes increasingly 
important in hospitals.  
Questions of causality, responsibility and blame have always been a part of the history of 
infections. During and after the outbreak investigation, questions of causality, responsibility 
and liability were raised: Who and what caused the outbreak, who were responsible for the 
extent of the outbreak, could the damages have been mitigated by acting sooner or differently, 
should anyone be punished?  
The outbreak prompted action in many areas. All actors involved analysed their situation, 
wrote statements and reviews, a national action plan against HAIs were published; regulations 
and guidelines for infection control and prevention in hospitals were revised (3, 25, 33, 34, 
160-166).  
6.1. An outbreak of Pseudomonas aeruginosa infections   
The Pseudomonas aeruginosa outbreak in Norway 2001-2002 is possibly the largest 
published outbreak of its kind to date with 231 confirmed cases, 161 of whom had a clinical 
infection. A total of 71 (31%) of the patients died while in an institution. All of those who 
died had severe underlying illnesses such as terminal cancers, multiple traumas, or severe 
respiratory or vascular disease. The cause of death was multifactoral for all these patients. To 
decide whether the P. aeruginosa infection contributed to the patients’ deaths can only be 
based on a best judgement as one has to assess all the different factors and estimate the impact 
of each factor. In an assessment based on all available information of whether the 
Pseudomonas infection contributed to the patient’s death, we concluded that it was probable 
for 34 of the 71 patients, improbable for 21, uncertain for 13, and impossible to evaluate 
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because of a lack of information for 3. In conclusion at least 161 patients had a clinical 
infection and 34 died prematurely as a consequence of the outbreak.  
The outbreak received much media attention, especially when the link to the Dent-O-Sept 
swab was documented. Afterwards the attention gradually subsided. Later Norway has 
experienced other large national outbreaks. In 2006 there was an outbreak with E. coli 
infection causing haemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS) (167). The outbreak – where 10 of 17 
cases had HUS as a clinical manifestation and one child died – received much more intense 
media coverage than the Dent-O-Sept outbreak. In 2005, a legionellosis outbreak in the 
county of Østfold with 56 confirmed cases and 10 deaths received less media attention than 
the HUS outbreak but more than the Dent-O-Sept outbreak from an subjective point of view 
at NIPH (168). There may be several reasons for this. One is a behaviour change of the media 
being increasingly aggressive and when an event catches on, journalists try to outdo each 
other in digging up minute details and blowing them out of proportions. Increasingly frequent 
the media coverage of outbreaks escalates to a level involving the national government and 
the parliament. The other main reason can be that whereas the Dent-O-Sept and legionellosis 
outbreaks to a large extent involved elderly and already ill people, the HUS outbreak mainly 
struck children. 
But for the small outbreaks or when the source is obvious, outbreak investigations are both 
resource and time consuming. When investigating a large, multicentre outbreak like the Dent-
O-Sept outbreak it is important to create a flexible central team and a robust network reaching 
all involved parties. With many participants one of the challenges is to let all voices be heard 
but at the same time make all pull in the same direction once a matter has been discussed and 
a decision reached. Not to loose sight when drowned in details, it can be wise to have one or a 
few “opponents” to evaluate the progress of the outbreak investigation at some distance in 
order to suggest corrections if needed.  
During the P. aeruginosa outbreak most of the communication between the central outbreak 
investigation team at NIPH and the local teams in the hospitals and the laboratories were by e-
mail. This was the first large outbreak investigation at NIPH were e-mail was the main mode 
of communication, and it proved to be quick and very resource efficient. On the day when the 
source of the outbreak was verified the head investigator sent and received a total of 33 e-
mails which was an immense amount in 2002 (but not today). The active use of postings on 
the NIPH website on the Internet was still in its beginning and would have been used more 
extensively today. The cooperation between all parties but a few exceptions was exemplary. 
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Only one local hospital outbreak team worked counter-actively in periods by creating an 
alternative trawling questionnaire to the one the others had agreed on and sending it to some 
of the other hospitals, requesting extra information on questionnaires to neighbouring 
hospitals in addition to what the central investigation team had collected and thereby placing 
extra burdens on them. At the height of the outbreak investigation we participated in several 
meetings with the top administration, including the managing director, of this hospital. 
Most hospital outbreaks are spread locally via persons, local products or the environment. 
When three and steadily more hospitals were involved the attention was directed towards a 
moist product mainly used in the ICU. However which product was difficult to elucidate as 
there is a huge array of moist devices and pharmaceuticals used in the ICU. A systematic 
trawling and testing of products had started when an infection control nurse tipped us about 
discoloured Dent-O-Sept swabs that had yielded Pseudomonas sp. but where the bacterial 
culture had been discarded before it was examined further.  
Similar to criminal investigations, genetic fingerprinting has become an important means of 
connecting cases to sources and causes. We were able to detect genotypically identical 
bacteria from patients, the product and the production facility thereby beyond doubt 
confirming the source of the outbreak. An increasing number of outbreaks are investigated 
with the help of microbiological genotyping (45, 60, 66, 88, 169). In addition, these methods 
are often used in the case definitions to separate the patients with the outbreak strain from 
other patients with infections with other strains of the same microbe. Genotyping of the many 
isolates of P. aeruginosa has been an expensive but indispensable part of this outbreak 
investigation. 
6.2. Contamination of the medical device   
Medical devices may be contaminated in each of the steps from ingredients and building 
materials, trough production, packing and transport to storage, use and reuse of the final 
product. 
Some, but not all of the Dent-O-Sept swabs were contaminated. How the P. aeruginosa 
bacteria came into the production equipment was never ascertained. One plausible hypothesis 
is that it entered via the municipal drinking water. Drinking water is not – and is not required 
to be – sterile. Moisture-prone bacteria like P. aeruginosa will naturally occur in municipal 
drinking water. The misconception of the purity of drinking water is also seen in the health 
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care setting were tap water is used in areas where only high-level disinfected or sterile water 
should be used.  
In the production facilities the cleaning and disinfection routines of the production equipment 
did not eradicate the bacteria. And there was no quality control system in place checking the 
microbiological quality of the final product. This was one of the recommendations given 
during an external evaluation and not followed up (162).  
However, other actors in addition to the producer were not abiding by regulations and 
guidelines. Many health care institutions found their logistic systems for purchase, storage 
and use of the swab to be deficient. Examples of reported deficiencies were: no centralised 
procedure for purchases, infection control personnel not taking part in the purchasing process 
and boxes of old batches were found in remote storage places. Many also lacked adequate 
reporting systems for faulty medical devices.  
Anecdotal information from several hospitals described that, after use, nurses would store the 
swab in a glass of tap water on the night stand and later reuse it for the same patient. The 
extent of this practice is unknown but where it occurred, the bacterial load these patients were 
exposed to may have increased exponentially as indicated in a report (170). The risk of 
becoming colonised or infected increases with the dose of bacteria the patient is exposed to.  
When a microbe is introduced into a hospital setting for example via a medical device, it may 
contaminate or colonise patients, personnel, the environment or other medical equipment. 
Approximately 1/3 of the cases in the P. aeruginosa outbreak had probably or definitely not 
used the swab. And in addition to having used the swab, receipt of mechanical ventilation was 
an independent risk factor for harbouring the outbreak strain of P. aeruginosa compared with 
having another strain of the same bacterium. We present two possible explanations for this:  
1. Injury to the tracheal epithelium may favour adherence of Pseudomonas, and P. 
aeruginosa is commonly found in ventilator associated pneumonia (4). When the outbreak 
strain repeatedly was introduced from the swabs, environment or persons it could easily 
lead to colonisation or infection in susceptible, ventilated patients.  
2. The ventilators themselves posed as a risk implying that the cleaning and disinfection of 
the ventilators between patients did not sufficiently eradicate the bacteria once it had been 
introduced. The problem of adequately disinfecting all parts of the ventilator or other 
medical equipment is well known from other outbreaks (64, 66, 80, 98).  
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Typical areas prone to P. aeruginosa contamination are sinks, faucets, flasks, other containers 
and tubes; in short, any moist area. When the bacterium first is introduced it needs hardly any 
nutrition to survive or even to multiply. Many containers with ordinary tap water are left to 
stand for too long periods without checking, cleaning and disinfection. Health care institutions 
need to perform risk assessments of all moist environments and to institute guidelines for 
microbiological quality control of these environments and guidelines for when only to use 
sterile water. 
6.3.  Microbial control of moist products   
Where there is water there are microbes if not the water is completely sterile. And if bacteria 
are present they will multiply. A bacterium like P. aeruginosa has affinity for moist 
environments and has minimal nutritional requirements (4, 7). There are several ways of 
controlling microbial growth in moist products. The first way is to sterilise the product with 
heat, gas or radiation. For products that are exposed to the environment, microbes will 
eventually enter the product and some sort of preservative is essential. In cosmetics and 
pharmaceuticals a range of preservatives have been used to control growth, of which parabens 
and benzoic acid and its chemical derivatives are common. In foodstuffs salt, sugar, acids, 
alcohols and gaseous environments are also commonly used. Most disinfectants intended for 
use as technical disinfection are too toxic to add to these moist products. There are few moist 
medical devices on the market that does not need to be sterile. 
All preservatives and other additives to these kinds of moist products are strictly regulated by 
law and categorised. For example, all approved food additives in the EU are listed in the 
Codex alimentarius and given an E-number. All preservatives are E200-E299, and sodium 
benzoate, for example is E211. 
Medical devices: In Norway laws and regulations of medical devices (24, 25) are for all 
practical purposes identical with those of the EU, including European Council Directive 
93/42/EEC concerning medical devices (26). For non-invasive medical devices in Class I, 
there are no demands for sterility. The devices must, when used, “not compromise the clinical 
condition or the safety of patients”. “The devices and manufacturing processes must be 
designed in such a way as to eliminate or reduce as far as possible the risk of infection to the 
patient, user and third parties.” Beyond this, the directive does not specify the microbial 
quality of the product, e.g. the absence of P. aeruginosa. And without any assistance from a 
third party the producer can draw a declaration of conformity. The responsibility for control 
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of medical devices is with the Directorate of Health and Social Affairs (now called the 
Directorate of Health). 
Pharmaceutical preparations: All medicinal products are strictly regulated and needs to be 
approved by the Norwegian Medicines Agency or a counterpart in another country in the EU 
in order to receive marketing authorisation (171, 172). According to the European 
Pharmacopoeia, pharmaceutical preparations for use in the respiratory tract are classified in a 
Category 2 where – in addition to other microbiological requirements – the absence of 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa needs to be documented (27).  
Cosmetics: As for the products mentioned above, cosmetics and body care products are 
regulated through an Act and a regulation (28, 29). As for medical devices the legislation is 
almost identical with that of the EU (30). The Regulation states that the producer shall 
produce and have available a dossier which describes: “The physico-chemical and 
microbiological specifications for the raw materials and the finished product and the purity 
and microbiological control criteria of the cosmetic product”. The appendices to the 
regulation give examples of groups of cosmetics and body care products and list which 
preservatives can be used. The “Notes of guidance” giving detailed recommendations to the 
Council Directive states that Pseudomonas aeruginosa must not be detectable in cosmetic 
products (31). The Norwegian Food Safety Authority is responsible for the control of 
cosmetics. 
There seems to be less specific demands for microbiological purity for non-invasive medical 
devices in Class I compared with other moist products. In their final report the Directorate of 
Health and Social Affairs stated the need to discuss whether non-sterile, moist medical 
devices should be reclassified to a higher class than Class I (164, 165). The issue was 
thoroughly debated at meeting for the authorities on medical devices from the Nordic 
countries in February 2004. The other Nordic authorities were quite reluctant to reclassify 
these products. Their main argument was that if the manufacturer had adhered to the current 
regulations and classifications the outbreak would not have occurred.  
The area of medical devices has not been prioritised for resources in the central health 
administration. This is one of the clear conclusions the Ministry of health drew in an internal 
review after the outbreak (34). Compared with the other Scandinavian countries, Finland and 
Great Britain, Norway had spent a lot less resources on the administration and control of 
medical devices. The resources allocated had mainly been used on controlling medical 
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devices of higher classes and controlling the technical control organisations. Only on direct 
enquiries the Board of Health (and later the Directorate of Health and Social Affairs) had 
followed up on Class I medical devices. 
6.4. What preservatives were used in the Dent-O-Sept moisturising 
liquid?   
Two of the major questions after the outbreak were: What preservatives in the moisturising 
liquid suppressed bacterial growth and how could the bacteria survive in the production 
facilities and in the individual wrapped swabs? 
One batch of moisturising liquid consisted of: Tap water (147 litres), 96% ethanol (3 litres), 
Glycerol (16 litres) and Vademecum, a commercially available mouth rinse (6 litres). The 
main ingredients of the mouth rinse are ethanol (44%) and sodium benzoate (5.25%) in 
addition to water. Of the three major possible preservatives the final concentration in the 
Dent-O-Sept moisturising liquid was calculated to be 2.3% ethanol; 9.3% glycerol and 0.18% 
sodium benzoate (173). The producer had used ethanol as an antimicrobial agent, glycerol as 
a moisturiser and Vademecum for taste and comfort.  
It is believed that ethanol and glycerol in such low concentrations have little documentable 
bacteriostatic effect. Sodium benzoate on the other hand, has antimicrobial effect in 
concentrations starting from 0.01%. However, the effect is largely dependant on the acidity of 
the solution, being at its maximum at pH 2.5-4.0 and weak above pH 4.5. In an expert report 
made for the Directorate of Health and Social Services the acidity measured in a limited 
number of swabs was approximately pH 7.0 (173). We remade a small batch of the 
moisturising liquid and measured a pH of 6.8 (174). At this pH level sodium benzoate has 
minimal antibacterial effect.  
In a controlled test two different strains of planktonic P. aeruginosa were added to the 
moisturising liquid. The bacteria were rapidly inactivated even in a 1:10 dilution of the liquid. 
So far it has not been elucidated what ingredients in the moisturising liquid that have the rapid 
bactericidal effect on P. aeruginosa. Nonetheless, the moisturising liquid inactivated 
planktonic bacteria even at a pH level of 6.8. Still the outbreak strain of P. aeruginosa 
survived in the production plant and in a number of wrapped swabs.  
Several hypotheses have been put forward to explain this apparent discrepancy. Our main 
hypothesis is biofilm formation. P. aeruginosa is well known to form biofilms (111, 134, 
135). Bacteria in biofilms have an increased ability to withstand antibiotics and disinfectants 
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(111, 135). We have shown that the cleaning and disinfection process in the production line 
probably did not reach all areas in the tank and piping system. A mature biofilm may spread 
to new locations through single cell dispersal or the shedding of clumps of biofilm (111, 112, 
134). Such clumps still have biofilm properties and may well have survived on a wrapped 
swab surrounded by a liquid with antimicrobial effect. 
An alternative hypothesis has been launched in the popular and medical press (175-179). This 
suggests that the pH may have risen in the liquid inside the wraps due to the chemical 
influence either from the glue used to attach the foam rubber heads to the stick or other 
materials inside the wrap. According to this hypothesis an increase in the pH may have 
lowered the antimicrobial effect of sodium benzoate. It is an interesting hypothesis. However 
it has one major flaw: The pH of the moisturising liquid and in different approximate remakes 
of it has been measured to be in the range of 6.4-7.7, and never below 6.4 (174, 178). In this 
range sodium benzoate has minimal preservative effect and pH alterations within this range 
do not alter sodium benzoate’s bactericidal ability.  
In conclusion, we still do not know which ingredients in the Dent-O-Sept liquid that are 
exerting its rapid bacteriostatic effect. It cannot be singly ethanol, glycerol or sodium 
benzoate in the concentrations and pH range of the mixed liquid. Whether they may have the 
tested bacteriostatic effect on planktonic P. aeruginosa by working in consort or if there are 
other unknown preservatives in the Vademecum mouth wash has not been tested. Out of pure 
curiosity it would be interesting to find the answer. However, the production of Dent-O-Sept 
swabs ceased in 2002 and any new producer of moist swabs would need to produce a 
declaration of conformity for their product where the issue is addressed. 
6.5. Medical devices as a source of infection  
The quantity of published hospital outbreaks is almost innumerable. A quick Internet search 
on PubMed searching for “hospital” and “outbreak” yielded 9384 articles. In the winter 
season epidemics of norovirus infections can be rampant as can influenza epidemics and 
outbreaks with the spread of Methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus.  
Medical devices and other equipment, solutions and liquids are responsible for a considerable 
number of outbreaks. Often they are related to moisture in one way or another.  
Pseudomonas aeruginosa is the dominant causative agent for outbreaks in hospital among the 
gram-negative opportunistic bacteria (35-37, 39, 41-44, 46, 49, 50, 53-55, 57-59, 64-67, 70, 
72, 84, 85, 99, 104, 180-183). Most are caused by medical devices directly or indirectly but 
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some are related to liquids like flush devices, hydrotherapy, bath toys or even bottled drinking 
water to name a few (35, 37, 39, 42, 67, 70, 85, 99, 104, 181, 182). Outbreaks have even been 
caused by lens prosthesis implants (44) and after a multiple organ transplantation (58). 
Of the other microbes related to medical devices and other equipment (74-76, 78-80, 86-90, 
92, 95-98, 103, 105) many are like P. aeruginosa gram-negative bacteria like Serratia 
marcescens (65, 74-78), Acinetobacter baumannii and other Acinetobacter spp. (79, 80), other 
species of Pseudomonas (84-87), Stenotrophomonas maltophilia (87, 88), and Burkholderia 
cepacia (89, 90, 92).  
All outbreaks are unique in one or more ways regarding causative agent, mode of 
transmission, duration, extensiveness, size, consequences, liability, etc. In most of these 
aspects the Dent-O-Sept outbreak is not unique, encompassing P. aeruginosa, a medical 
device, moisture, hospital setting, ICU, and a mixture of direct transmission from the medical 
device and indirect via the hospital environment. However, the Dent-O-Sept outbreak is 
possibly the largest Pseudomonas outbreak ever to be published regarding the number 
affected (231 patients, 161 with infection, 70 colonised), the number of deaths (71 while 
hospitalised, and where the Pseudomonas infection probably contributed to the death for 34 of 
them) and the number of health care institutions involved (24 hospitals). 
6.6. Claiming causality   
In the scientific laboratory all variables are known, and the scientist can change one factor at 
the time and measure its effect on the outcome variables. Modern epidemiology is complex; a 
range of factors contribute to an outcome, many of which are unknown. And in outbreak 
investigations, the investigator cannot control the exposure variables because they have 
already occurred. In addition, there is a time constraint.  
The basic concept of causality is a fundamental and integral part of daily language. However, 
when trying to define the term in philosophy (146, 148, 149), science (140, 144, 145, 147, 
152-154, 184-186) or law (187-191), it becomes utterly difficult and complex to a degree that 
some even discourages the use of the term. Instead euphemisms like ‘associated with’, ‘linked 
to’, ‘related to’, and ‘due to’ are used signalling causation but to a somewhat weaker degree.  
Tradition on causal theories differs between the different scientific disciplines. Applying the 
various theories on the major actors and events in the outbreak shed light from different 
angles and proved to be helpful in the analysis. Especially using counterfactual reasoning 
which is frequently used in tort law simplified the complex picture. Counterfactual theories 
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have been used in epidemiology where the term “the counterfactual ideal” has been coined to 
describe the perfect unexposed experience (192). However, it would be helpful to develop the 
counterfactual reasoning from tort law further in epidemiology. When used on the Dent-O-
Sept outbreak the main actors responsible were easier to identify. Our analysis concluded 
clearly that the major necessary condition causing the outbreak was the contamination of the 
swabs in the production facility. Without this contamination, the Dent-O-Sept outbreak would 
not have happened. Many other factors contributed to the outbreak and the size of it, the reuse 
of the single use swabs in the hospitals being the most important.  
Moral responsibility is related to legal responsibility. As mentioned earlier, outbreak 
investigations have similarities with police investigations. In large outbreaks, especially 
where people are injured or die, the police regularly start an investigation. With a clear causal 
association between the contaminated swabs and Pseudomonas infection and death among 
patients, it would have been interesting to see whether the conclusion would have been the 
same in a criminal court case.  
6.7. Invasive Pseudomonas aeruginosa infection   
For the period 1999-2002, we found a rate of invasive P. aeruginosa infection of 0.20 per 
1 000 hospital stays. Studies from other countries have indicated much higher rates, between 
0.94 and 1.8 per 1000 hospital stays (114, 120, 123-125, 127, 128, 130) in tertiary referral 
hospitals and university hospitals and 0.43 and 0.59 per 1000 hospital stays in community 
hospitals (118, 119). The low incidence in Norway compared with studies from other 
countries may partly be explained by study design. Our study was nationwide and population-
based and included all somatic hospital stays in Norway. Certain hospital departments such as 
dermatology and gynaecology and obstetrics, and community or specialty hospitals with less 
than 5000 discharges per year, are known to have low rates of P. aeruginosa invasive 
infection so these departments may have contributed to the low reported overall rates. 
However, no Norwegian hospital had a higher rate than 0.42 per 1000 hospital stays. 
To our knowledge only one other population based study on invasive P. aeruginosa infections 
has been published (193). This study based on the population of a county in Minnesota, USA 
in 1999-2006, has higher incidence rates than our findings with 10.8 patients per 100 000 pyar 
in men and 3.7 in women compared with 4.3 and 2.0 respectively per 100 000 pyar in our 
study. 
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We suggest that one explanation for the low rates was the prudent use of antibiotics in 
hospitals in Norway with low overall antibiotic consumption and low use of broad spectrum 
antibiotics. The use of narrow-spectrum drugs is encouraged (194-196). Indiscriminate use of 
antibiotics, especially broad-spectrum antibiotics, is known to be associated with development 
of resistance and selection of resistant bacteria, such as P. aeruginosa (4-7, 197).  
The use of empiric broad spectrum antibiotics such as most 3rd generation cephalosporins, 
which may give Pseudomonas an advantage, are generally discouraged. For empiric treatment 
of septicaemia where broad spectrum coverage is necessary, penicillin plus an 
aminoglycoside is the recommended standard treatment in most hospital departments. In 
general, aminoglycosides are active against Pseudomonas and have a high threshold for 
development of resistance (tobramycin considered most active), thereby avoiding selection 
pressure favouring these bacteria (198). 
Several risk factors for invasive P. aeruginosa infection and death have previously been 
identified (4, 5, 7, 113, 123, 126, 127, 129, 130, 199). Using complete national discharge 
statistics, we were able to calculate absolute rates of infection among patients with various 
underlying diseases. Our study confirms that P. aeruginosa infection is a major risk to 
patients with cancer, immunodeficiency, renal failure and certain other diseases.  
Invasive P. aeruginosa infection is a serious disease with a high CFR, 35% in our study. Most 
patients who died from invasive P. aeruginosa infection died within a short time of being 
diagnosed. The patient groups with the following underlying diseases had the highest 
mortality risk per 1000 discharges: Malignant neoplasms of lymphoid and haematopoietic 
tissue, other diseases of blood and blood-forming organs, organ transplantation and renal 
failure. Among the patients with invasive P. aeruginosa infection the following factors were 
independently associated with an increased CFR: Having an underlying risk diagnoses 
associated with P. aeruginosa infection; admission to an ICU; old age and immuno-
suppressive treatment prior to infection. A clinical P. aeruginosa diagnosis only of UTI was 
protective, whereas meningitis, pneumonia and septicaemia increased the risk although not 
significantly. Other studies list similar risk factors (123, 126, 127, 130). As demonstrated by 
others (124), bacteraemic pneumonia had a high CFR.  
6.8. Methodological weaknesses and limitations 
An outbreak investigation is getting the best possible results in a chaotic world with limited 
resources and under heavy time pressure. Once the source of the outbreak is detected and 
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removed, the time constraint is relieved and a more thorough collection of data can be 
performed. However, if it takes too long the interest of the collaborators may subside and the 
quality of data may weaken. For the Dent-O-Sept outbreak the source was detected 8 April 
2002, the scientific protocol following the outbreak investigation was finalised in late June 
2002 and the last information entered into the crude database in August 2003. 
There are always four possible explanations to a finding: 1. it can be true; 2. random error; 
3. bias; or 4. confounding. In addition, there is always a possibility that the study design is 
flawed or inadequate to answer the hypothesis raised, or that inferences drawn from the 
results are invalid.  
6.8.1. Random error  
Random error is the portion of variation in a measurement that has no apparent connection to 
any other measurement or variable, generally regarded as due to chance (9). It is the 
variability in the data that we cannot readily explain after the systematic error is eliminated. A 
confidence interval is used to indicate the amount of random error in the estimation (192). By 
convention most results in epidemiology are given with a 95% confidence interval. This 
means that if the study were repeated many times and in an identical manner, the confidence 
interval should include the correct measure 95% of the time, on the condition that there are 
not other errors. For all effect ratios presented in our studies the point estimate with a 95 % 
confidence interval were given to account for possible random error. 
6.8.2. Bias  
Bias is defined in several ways. The textbook definition is all deviations of results or 
inferences from the truths (9). This will include random error, confounding, effect 
modification, flawed design, prejudices and wrong interpretations. In practical epidemiology 
the term bias is usually restricted to two forms of bias, selection bias and information bias. 
Selection bias is mainly a problem that affects case-control studies where it gives rise to non-
comparability between cases and controls when cases are not representative of the population 
that produced the cases. Selection bias can also occur in cohort studies when completeness of 
follow-up or case ascertainment differs between exposure categories.  
Information bias is a flaw in measuring exposure or outcome data. There are two types of 
misclassification: 1. Non-differential misclassification where the probability of exposure 
being misclassified is the same regardless of outcome status. This type of misclassification 
will principally weaken the measured effect. 2. Differential misclassification where the 
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probability of exposure being misclassified depends on the outcome status and vice versa. 
Differential misclassification can either weaken or strengthen a measured effect. There are 
two main types of differential misclassifications: 1. Recall bias which is typical in case-
control studies where cases and controls remember exposures differently. 2. Observer bias 
where those collecting data classifies data differently for different groups under study. 
Case-control-study 
This study in Paper I to identify causes of infection with the outbreak strain was restricted to 
severe disease, i.e. where the bacterium had been isolated from blood or CSF. The advantage 
was that the case definition was clearer and we need not speculate whether for example a skin 
infection was merely a colonisation. However, by only selecting patients with the most severe 
disease, the analysis loses generalisability. That said, from a clinical and epidemiological 
perspective, it is more important to look for risk factors among the most severely ill patients.  
The aim of the study was to to identify the causes for infection with the outbreak strain as 
compared to being infected with other strains of P. aeruginosa. The aim was not to identify 
risk factors for P. aeruginosa infection by any strain. This aim had consequences for the 
choice of control group, namely patients with non-outbreak strain P. aeruginosa identified in 
blood or CSF. We reasoned that these patients had the same risk factors as cases for getting a 
severe P. aeruginosa infection, for instance immunosupression. Thus, we avoided the 
cumbersome task of controlling for the unspecific concept “underlying diasease”. In 
epidemiological terms, we defined the source population as patients with P. aeruginosa 
isolated from blood or CSF.  If, on the other hand, we had defined the source population as all 
hospitalised patients and sampled controls among them, the analysis would have been biased 
towards severity of disease and not of having the outbreak strain. It would have been hard to 
differentitate the risk factors of invasive P. aeruginosa infection in general from risk factors 
for outbreak strain infection. Had controls been selected among patients admitted to the ICU, 
the analysis could have been biased the other way as only 2/3 of the case patients had been 
admitted to the ICU during their stay.  
Choosing as cases patients infected with one certain strain or subtype of a microbe and as 
controls patients with other strains or subtypes has been named a case-case study (200). This 
design can be useful for communicable diseases where only a potentially non-representative 
fraction of the infected patients are identified and thus eligible for being cases. This is the 
situation for salmonellosis for example where most patients do not seek medical care. To 
control for this selection process of those identified with the disease, controls are chosen 
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among those identified with other subtypes of the same microbe and who concequently have 
gone through the same selection process. In essence the case-control study in Paper I is a 
case-case study where cases and controls differ only regarding the genotype of P. aeruginosa. 
However, our purpose was not to control for the selection process of the cases. In the hospital 
setting blood cultures are taken from almost all patients were invasive disease is suspected 
and the detection rate is high. Hence, few patients with invasive P. aeruginosa infection will 
go undetected. Our choice of the case-case variant of the case-control study was instead 
guided by the aim of the study, i.e. to identify the cause of the outbreak as efficiently as 
possible. 
Microbiology 
The main challenge in outbreak investigations is that of bias. It is crucial to detect all cases 
and to gather correct information on all of them which can be said to be a form of selection 
bias. The clear assignment from the Ministry and the politicians was to detect everyone who 
was colonised or infected with the outbreak strain of Pseudomonas aeruginosa. All stored 
cultures of Pseudomonas were genotyped. Laboratories had mainly stored cultures of P. 
aeruginosa from blood and CSF and in the retrospective part of the study we may have 
missed cases with the outbreak strain from other body sites. In the prospective part of the 
study we believe that a great majority of the cases were detected. For the whole period we do 
not know how many with the outbreak strain that were not sampled, especially outside 
hospitals. In conclusion the real number of affected patients was probably much higher. 
However, there is good reason to believe that most of the missing cases have only been 
colonised or had less serious infections. Consequently one can claim a selection bias towards 
more serious cases, but none of the studies intended to give a numerical distribution of the 
clinical presentation of Pseudomonas infection. 
For the study of invasive Pseudomonas aeruginosa infection the same dataset for the cases 
was used. As the laboratories keep records and store samples from blood and CSF we believe 
few cases were missed. Some samples were not available for genotyping which could have 
influenced the comparison between the outbreak strain and the others.  
Five laboratories genotyped the bacteria to identify the outbreak strain, four using the same 
PFGE typing method, the fifth AFLP. The methods had been compared in their ability to 
detect the outbreak strain and no discrepancies in the results were detected.  
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Environmental sampling 
All initial environmental sampling from the production facilities and from the swabs were 
done by direct seeding on a lactose and blood agar dish. Without prior enrichment in a growth 
broth we may have some false negative results. This was indicated when the laboratory at the 
municipal Food Control Authority some weeks after the system audit performed repeated 
environmental sampling of the production facilities and used an enrichment broth. Then they 
detected the Pseudomonas bacterium in several places where the system audit had not (170). 
Whether to use an enrichment broth or not is a trade off between spending resources and 
increasing the sensitivity somewhat. More than 1500 swabs were examined in addition to 
patients and environmental samples. 
Clinical information 
For all included patients the clinicians were obliged to fill in a one page questionnaire; and we 
received it for all but two patients. Although great efforts were made to ensure that the 
outbreak investigation was given highest priority, the quality of the returned questionnaires 
varied. Extensive efforts were made to ensure completeness and quality of the data, including 
contacting the clinicians and linkage with the National Population Registry to search for 
deaths among patients. Consequently, we believe most of the collected patient data is 
accurate, but some information may have been missed, especially regarding some of the 
subordinate discharge diagnoses. However, all but 3 of the 567 patients had at least one main 
underlying disease recorded other than the Pseudomonas infection. There were few patients in 
several of the risk diagnosis groups (as listed in Paper IV, table 3). Missing information in 
either of these groups could have influenced the incidence and mortality rates and the case 
fatality, and the results need to be interpreted with caution. However, all numerators and 
denominators are given in the table, making it possible for the reader to judge the results. 
Most of the variables are factual (e.g. whether the patient had been admitted to the ICU during 
the hospital stay) and are not much influenced by observation bias. However, one variable 
especially was vulnerable for subjective assessment: If the patient died, “May the patient’s 
death be related to the detection of Pseudomonas infection?”. To control for that two of the 
paper’s authors meticulously assessed all available information for each of the dead patients, 
including the clinician's assessment, underlying illnesses, dates of onset, diagnosis and death, 
and other clinical and microbiological information. There was varying degree of missing 
values for the variables, most for the question asking whether the patient had used the Dent-
O-Sept swab during the stay. This variable was also the one most subjected to observation 
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bias as most clinicians knew whether the patient had harboured the outbreak strain or not. 
However, for 1/3 of the patient with the outbreak strain the clinician wrote that that patient 
had not or probably not used the swab.  
Denominator data 
Denominator data in Paper IV were all collected from quality controlled national databases 
like Statistics Norway and The Norwegian Patient Register. There is always a challenge in 
combining data from different datasets as the variable definitions may vary. For the dataset in 
Paper IV it was most crucial for the definition of underlying disease. From the national 
register we picked the main and up to seven subordinate discharge diagnoses whereas on the 
clinician’s forms there was free space to record as many as they wanted. No more than 10 
underlying diagnoses were detected and recorded.  
6.8.3. Confounding 
The word confounding is derived from Latin confundere meaning to mix together (9). A 
confounder (C) is a variable that is associated with the exposure variable (E) and has an effect 
on the outcome (O) and is not an intermediate factor in the causal pathway between the 
exposure and outcome variables (figure 6). For example a measured association between 
coffee drinking and pancreatic cancer may be due to a higher proportion of coffee drinkers 
among smokers than among non-smokers. A reanalysis stratified by smoking status may show 
no association between coffee drinking and cancer in either group of smoking status. Then 
smoking status is confounding the first measured association. However, not all associated 
variables are confounders (201). 
Figure 6. Association between exposure, outcome and confounder 
 
 
 
C 
(confounder) 
O 
(outcome) 
E 
(exposure) 
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Confounding can be controlled for in several ways: 1. Restriction of the population or cases 
studied; 2. Matching cases and controls on certain variables; 3. Randomisation of study 
subjects in experimental-type studies; 4. Stratification of the study population on the 
presumed confounding variables; and 5. Multivariable modelling, a powerful technique to 
control for several possible confounders. The first three methods are study design strategies 
and the last two are analysis strategies. 
Most of the results from the outbreak investigation are descriptive with no association 
between variables posed and no statistical analysis performed. As described above, all effect 
ratios are presented with a point estimate and a 95 % confidence interval to account for 
possible random error.  
In Paper I we showed a clear association between the use of the Dent-O-Sept swab and having 
the outbreak strain of Pseudomonas aeruginosa. When controlling for known possible 
confounders the strength of association dropped from OR=7.9 to OR=5.3. There may also be 
other, unknown confounders that we did not control for. In addition, use of the Dent-O-Sept 
swab was the variable with the highest number of missing values in this case-control analysis 
(33 of 198 missing). If differential, it may introduce observation bias.  
However, the association between having the outbreak strain and the Dent-O-Sept swab was 
also established in other ways. Genotypically identical strains of the bacterium were detected 
in patients and in Dent-O-Sept swabs (and in the production plant) and thereby unequivocally 
establishing how the outbreak strain was brought into the health care services. In complex 
settings there are usually more than one factor contributing to an outcome. In this outbreak 
approximately 1/3 of the cases had not used the swab. Consequently, indirect transmission in 
the hospital setting via health care workers, medical devices or the environment appears to be 
an important mode of transmission in this outbreak, although not tested specifically in the 
outbreak investigation. 
In two papers we analysed risk factors for dying among patients with invasive Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa infection. In Paper I several factors were identified in the univariable analysis but 
only having used the Dent-O-Sept swab remained independently associated in the 
multivariable regression analysis. Logically it does not make sense that using a mouth swab 
would increase the risk of dying among patients with invasive P. aeruginosa infection. 
Consequently we interpreted the results as residual confounding where having used the swab 
served as a marker for severe underlying disease.  
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In Paper IV including a larger number of patients over a longer time interval (567 patients as 
compared with 198 in Paper I) and several new variables, more variables were found to be 
independently associated with an increased risk of dying in the multivariable regression 
analysis. This time, swab use was not independently associated with dying. One explanation 
for the difference can be controlling for the residual confounding by adding new clinical 
variables on underlying disease and clinical manifestation of the P. aeruginosa infection; 
another is larger inaccuracies in the recording of Dent-O-Sept swab use outside of the 
outbreak period. 
In Paper IV, except for the analysis of risk factors for dying, only univariable analyses were 
performed because denominator data were aggregate data. Thus, we were unable to do 
individual level analyses of relative risks for infection, nor controlling for potential 
confounders by multivariable regression analysis. As age and gender are the two major 
possible confounders that influence the incidence risks, we may not easily compare the groups 
of underlying diseases. As explained above for the CFR we were able to control for 
confounders by binomial multivariable regression. 
6.8.4. Effect modification 
Effect modification – sometimes called effect-measure modification – refers to the situation in 
which a measure of effect changes over values of some other variable (192). Effect 
modification can be tested statistically by looking for interaction using statistical software 
programmes. However, eyeballing and thorough assessment is the best way to judge whether 
there is effect modification. In Paper I we assessed whether there was effect modification with 
the two variables “use of swab” and “receipt of mechanical ventilation” regarding the 
outcome of having the outbreak strain of P. aeruginosa. One may hypothesise that the 
presence or absence of swab use in mechanically ventilated patients influenced the variable 
“receipt of mechanical ventilation” as a risk factor for having the outbreak strain. We did not 
find clear indications for effect modification. However, one should bear in mind that the 
figures are small (Paper I, Table 3). 
6.8.5. Analysis of causality 
Paper III on causality is of a different genre than the other three. Rather than being 
quantitative and analysing figures it is qualitative and analyses and debates concepts and 
theories. Consequently there are no figures with confidence intervals but a discourse aiming at 
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elucidating the concept of causality through a real life example. In its nature the paper is more 
subjective.  
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7. Main conclusions and further studies   
7.1. Main conclusions   
In the outbreak with Pseudomonas aeruginosa in Norway, we detected a total of 231 patients 
with genotypically identical strains of the bacterium from 24 hospitals in 2000-2002. Seventy-
one of the patients died while hospitalised, and for 34 the Pseudomonas infection probably 
contributed to the patients’ deaths. The same outbreak strain was isolated from 76 mouth 
swabs called Dent-O-Sept from 12 different batches produced from September 2001 to April 
2002 and from the production facility. In total more than 250 of 1565 examined swabs were 
contaminated with one or more microbial species. 
In a complex situation like an outbreak with many acts, actors and factors playing larger or 
smaller parts, applying various theories for causality and responsibility from different fields 
like science, philosophy and law – especially legal theories and counterfactual reasoning – 
helped elucidating their roles and responsibilities. Many factors contributed to causing the 
outbreak, but contamination of a medical device in the production facility was the major 
necessary condition. The reuse of the medical device in hospitals primarily contributed to the 
size of the outbreak. In addition there were many errors and flaws in the chain from the 
production of the swabs, through purchasing and storage systems in the health care 
institutions to the use of the swabs and reporting of defective devices. The unintended error 
by its producer – and to a minor extent by the hospital practice – was mainly due to non-
application of relevant knowledge and skills, and appears to constitute professional 
negligence. 
This outbreak is possibly the largest published P. aeruginosa outbreak to date. Although P. 
aeruginosa usually do not cause infection in healthy persons, it frequently does in patients 
with certain underlying diseases, and in patients with disrupted barriers, especially in the ICU. 
Invasive P. aeruginosa infection is a rare disease with an incidence rate of 3.16 per 100 000 
pyar or 0.20 per 1 000 hospital stays, but is very serious for those contracting it with a 30 day 
case fatality rate of 33%. Patients with malignant neoplasms of lymphoid and haematopoietic 
tissue and other diseases of blood and blood-forming organs have the highest risk of infection. 
Prudent antibiotic use is one possible explanation for much lower rates of infection in Norway 
compared with all other published studies from other countries. 
Medical devices, moist equipment and solutions and moist environments are frequently 
associated with outbreaks with P. aeruginosa and related moisture-prone bacteria. Lack of 
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adherence to standard precautions for infection control and prevention by hospital personnel 
contributes to the propagation of these outbreaks. 
Biofilm formation is possibly the more common of the two distinct modes of behaviour for 
bacteria; the other being the planktonic mode. Biofilm formation is the most plausible 
explanation for the survival of the bacteria in the production facilities and in the wrapped 
swabs. Bacterial biofilms are less sensitive to disinfection and make it more difficult to 
eradicate. Not abiding by the production regulations, e.g. the requirement to have quality 
assurance systems including an effective microbiological control system, made the 
contamination possible in the production process.  
Outbreak investigations are essential to detect causes of an outbreak and to gain experience in 
order to prevent their recurrence. Investigating large, multicentre outbreaks is resource 
demanding and necessitates a defined network structure where everyone know their role and 
qualifications and try upmost to cooperate. Expertise in a variety of fields is essential. 
Molecular finger-printing techniques to identify the outbreak strain of the microbe and 
discriminate against other strains have become an indispensable part of most outbreak 
investigations.  
7.2. Proposed actions and further studies  
After the outbreak all parties involved, from producers and private companies to hospitals and 
all national, administrative bodies for health services, revised their guidelines, made reviews 
and summaries and proposed action plans. A national “Action plan to prevent hospital 
acquired infections” was made as a direct consequence of the outbreak (161) and has recently 
been revised (3). 
Medical devices 
• The control and audit of producers of medical devices should improve, also of producers 
of non-sterile medical devices in Class I. Increased resources should be allocated on a 
national level to support infection control personnel in health care institutions who have 
enquiries about medical devices. 
• The reporting systems for errors in medical devices and other equipment and facilities in 
the health services are complex and cumbersome. A revision and coordination has started 
but is still not finalised.  
• Moist medical devices are prone to cause infections and outbreaks if not properly 
manufactured and used. The Council Directive (26) may have been sufficient to prevent 
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the outbreak if it had been followed by the producer, but it is not optimal. Preservatives 
with documented effect should be obligatory in all moist, non-sterile medical devices, 
parallel to what exists for cosmetics and medicinal products.  
• A systematic assessment should be made for the level of disinfection or sterility of all 
devices, other equipment, solutions, food, water and medicines to be used on different 
groups of infection-prone patients, especially in ICUs. Only documentable quality 
controlled, high-level disinfected products and items should be used in the oropharynx of 
susceptible patients. 
Outbreak investigations 
• Small outbreaks are not very resource-demanding and can in most instances be covered 
through regular budgets. Large outbreaks can be very costly. The process of securing 
financing for genotyping of the many hundred strains of P. aeruginosa was unnecessarily 
cumbersome. Streamlining of these processes needs to come in place.  
• Infection control personnel in hospitals should have easy access to theoretical and 
practical training in epidemiology and outbreak investigation. 
Infection control and prevention 
National action plans to prevent HAIs list many admirable aims and measures and contain 
descriptions used on festive occasions. However, in contrast to several institutions on a 
national level, most hospital administrations do not give priority and resources to infection 
control and prevention. Infection control does not have a high status in the hospital hierarchy, 
is understaffed, and is not able to fulfil the requirements set up in laws and regulations.  
• The four Regional Health Authorities and the administrations of the local Health Trusts 
need to review the new national strategy, revise their current infection control strategy 
plans and make detailed plans for the implementation of this new strategy. 
Surveillance 
There is no national surveillance system for P. aeruginosa and other similar opportunistic 
bacteria. And probably it will be unwise to include them in the current national system (202). 
Most hospitals have cooperation between infection control and the microbiology laboratories 
and some have local systems for reporting of microbiological detections in the hospital.  
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• An assessment should be done at the local or regional level of which microbes that are 
desirable to watch. Local systems in hospitals need to be developed for efficient 
surveillance of these microbes. 
• On a national level automatic harvesting of data will be possible through the national 
health net system. When in place NIPH should in collaboration with the microbiology 
laboratories develop a system for surveillance of indicator microbes. 
• One hospital has used a surveillance method from private industry called statistical 
process control (SPC) on the Pseudomonas outbreak to see if the outbreak could have 
been detected earlier (203). This method and others need to be developed further and 
implemented if effective.  
Pseudomonas infections 
• More studies are needed on risk factors for infection caused by opportunistic pathogens 
among different groups of debilitated patients and how to prevent them from occurring. 
• More studies are needed on bacteria forming biofilms and ways of eradicating them from 
environmental surfaces, medical devices and biofilm forming infections in humans. 
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Abstract
In 2002, Norway experienced a large outbreak of Pseudomonas aeruginosa infections in hospitals
with 231 confirmed cases. This fuelled intense public and professional debates on what were the
causes and who were responsible. In epidemiology, other sciences, in philosophy and in law there
is a long tradition of discussing the concept of causality. We use this outbreak as a case; apply
various theories of causality from different disciplines to discuss the roles and responsibilities of
some of the parties involved. Mackie's concept of INUS conditions, Hill's nine viewpoints to study
association for claiming causation, deterministic and probabilistic ways of reasoning, all shed light
on the issues of causality in this outbreak. Moreover, applying legal theories of causation
(counterfactual reasoning and the "but-for" test and the NESS test) proved especially useful, but
the case also illustrated the weaknesses of the various theories of causation.
We conclude that many factors contributed to causing the outbreak, but that contamination of a
medical device in the production facility was the major necessary condition. The reuse of the
medical device in hospitals contributed primarily to the size of the outbreak. The unintended error
by its producer – and to a minor extent by the hospital practice – was mainly due to non-application
of relevant knowledge and skills, and appears to constitute professional negligence. Due to criminal
procedure laws and other factors outside the discourse of causality, no one was criminally charged
for the outbreak which caused much suffering and shortening the life of at least 34 people.
Introduction
In 2002, we traced the source of a large outbreak of Pseu-
domonas aeruginosa infections to contaminated mouth
swabs extensively used in Norwegian health care [1]. The
investigation revealed many weaknesses and errors in the
chain from production to use [2].
During and after the outbreak investigation, questions of
causality, responsibility and liability were raised: Who
and what caused the outbreak, who were responsible for
the extent of the outbreak, could the damages have been
mitigated by acting sooner or differently, should anyone
be punished? Questions of causality, responsibility and
blame have always been a part of the history of infections.
Two examples are the debate on where the Spanish flu
came from and who was responsible for starting the Aids
epidemic.
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The concept of causality is intuitively simple and yet so
intricately complex. In epidemiology causality has been
hotly debated [3-11]. In philosophy of science there is a
long tradition of discussing both the content of the term
and how to achieve knowledge about the association of
events [12]. In law, decisions on responsibility and liabil-
ity rests on whether a specific action has caused specific
harm or loss to another, and jurisprudence frequently
defers to science in order to settle issues of causality [13-
16]. However, not only is the discourse of causality in the
philosophy of science interesting for law, reciprocally the
debate on legal causation, especially in tort law, is useful
for the scientists and the philosophers of science. In all
these three disciplines (science, philosophy and law) and
in practical life this discourse has implications for placing
moral responsibility, blame, honour and dishonour. Con-
sequently the general debate on causality is of interest
both for scientists, manufacturers, and lawyers, as for the
general public because it influences moral as well as pro-
fessional norms.
In this article, we will use the outbreak of P. aeruginosa
infections to illustrate the relevance of various theories of
causality and discuss the role of the different participants.
Then we will discuss the responsibility and fallibility for
two of the main actors in the outbreak.
Setting the scene
Late February 2002, the Norwegian Institute of Public
Health (NIPH) was alerted of a possible increase in the
number of Pseudomonas infections in clinical wards of
Norwegian hospitals [1]. After a strenuous outbreak inves-
tigation, on 8 April 2002, the outbreak strain was isolated
from a domestically produced mouth swab for use in
health care, called "Dent-O-Sept" (figure 1). The finding
was publicised, the product was recalled, and the produc-
tion ceased permanently.
The outbreak strain was detected in swabs from 12
batches produced in 2001 and 2002 [2] and from the pro-
duction line in the factory. An audit of the producer
revealed several breaches of production regulations [17].
Health care institutions reported some extent of non-
proper reuse of the swabs and weaknesses in their pur-
chasing systems.
The strain was detected in 231 patients from 24 hospitals,
of whom 71 (31%) died while hospitalised; all had severe
underlying disease. For at least 34 patients the investiga-
tors concluded that the P. aeruginosa infection probably
contributed to the patient's death [1]. No one was found
criminally liable for the outbreak.
Two of the authors (BGI and PA) were responsible for the
outbreak investigation at the Norwegian Institute of Pub-
lic Health [1,2]. After six years have passed we feel that we
can give a balanced review of the causes of the outbreak
but will abstain from evaluating our role in it.
So, what was the cause of the outbreak, and who were
responsible? Let us first examine the issues of causation
from a scientific point of view, and then relate them to the
legal issues of responsibility and liability.
Analysis
Before presenting theories on causality, responsibility and
liability we need to define what was caused, i.e. what was
the epidemiological outcome. We have asked "what
caused the outbreak", but "the outbreak" is a rather dif-
fuse concept and consists of the sum of individuals who
each had their own set of factors contributing to them
being included. Although the attention was brought to the
individual cases by clinical manifestations (infections),
we included in the outbreak all patients with genotypi-
cally identical strains of P. aeruginosa, irrespective of sur-
vival or severity of disease [1]. For this analysis we will
make it clear which of the four different outcomes we
have in mind; 1. being a case as defined in the outbreak
investigation, 2. having a P. aeruginosa infection, irrespec-
tive of type of strain, 3. dying from P. aeruginosa infection
or 4. the outbreak as a whole.
Causality
We often say that one thing causes another, like "rain
causes flooding" and "smoking causes cancer", although it
is not always true. We don't have a flood every time it is
raining, and flooding can have other reasons than rain: a
broken water pipe for example.
The philosophical basis of the dominant approach for
testing theories in medicine is the hypothetico-deductive
model as described by for example David Hume and Karl
Popper. According to this model it is impossible to
The Dent-O-Sept mouth swabFigur  1
The Dent-O-Sept mouth swab.
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achieve absolute proof for a scientific hypothesis; tests
performed can only corroborate or falsify the hypothesis.
Consequently one can never prove causality between fac-
tors and an outcome, only strengthen or weaken a pro-
posed association. In this tradition Sir Austin Bradford
Hill listed nine viewpoints from which to study the asso-
ciation of two variables in order to claim causation [3].
Causation in epidemiology
Classic epidemiology has been mainly backward looking,
seeking an explanation to an event. In much of the 19th
century there was a profound debate on what caused
many of the major diseases of the time, being it miasmata
(stench or bad air) or contagions [18]. For a disease like
cholera John Snow, the father of epidemiology, was in
favour of the theory of a contagion which he called "mor-
bid matter" [19]. Late in the 19th century, a prominent
microbiologist, Robert Koch, formulated a set of postu-
lates that needed to be fulfilled in order to claim that a
micro-organism caused a specific disease [20,21]. Accord-
ing to his postulates we need both necessary and the suf-
ficient conditions to claim causal relationship between a
microbe and a disease.
A century later MacMahon stated that there are two ways
of classifying ill persons, either by manifestational criteria
(grouping ill persons according to symptoms or clinical
signs, e.g. common cold, schizophrenia or meningitis) or
by causal criteria (grouping ill persons with respect to a
specified experience believed to be a cause of their illness,
e.g. lead poisoning or meningococcal disease) [22]. To
have a Pseudomonas aeruginosa infection implies by name
and definition causality of the bacterium.
Causation in law
The Norwegian legal system belongs to the French-Ger-
man legal tradition which differs from the Anglo-Ameri-
can law in placing relatively more emphasis on statutory
law than the judiciary legal institutions in the making of
the legal framework. However, regarding tort law and cau-
sality the principles of the two legal systems are very sim-
ilar. Likewise, both legal systems have a lower threshold
for civil liability than criminal liability. There are several
examples from recent history in Norway where the
accused was found not guilty in the criminal court case
but was convicted to pay economic compensation in a fol-
lowing civil lawsuit.
Causal connection in law is usually divided into two parts,
"cause-in-fact" and "proximate cause" [16,23]. "Cause-in-
fact" comes closest to what is regarded as causality in sci-
ence. However, while science mostly deals with causal
generalisation, law focuses more on causes of specific
events. One standard method of establishing factual cau-
sation is the "but-for" test, aiming at excluding those fac-
tors that had no impact on the course of events. Another
influential test for causation is the NESS-test, i.e. Neces-
sary Element of a Sufficient Set test [23,24]. "Proximate
cause", also called "adequate cause", embodies reasons
for limiting the extent of legal responsibility and liability.
Additionally, deciding on legal responsibility and liability
involves a counterfactual proposition, i.e., if a condition
that in fact occurred had not occurred, then the outcome
would have been different. Both the "but-for" test and the
NESS test can be part of such counterfactual propositions.
The "but-for" test asks: Would the consequences have
occurred in these circumstances had the condition not
been present? The NESS test asks: In these circumstances,
is the condition a necessary member of a set of conditions
that are together sufficient to produce the consequence
[24]. Over-determination and joint determination are
weaknesses of the "but-for" test, whereas lack of determi-
nation challenges the NESS test [22].
Counterfactual theories of causation in sciences
The central question in counterfactual theories of causa-
tion is "What would have happened if not event c had
happened?" And the answer is: "If not event c had
occurred, then the event e would not have occurred" [25].
Counterfactual reasoning can be used both in determinis-
tic and probabilistic models. In daily life and in medicine
counterfactual reasoning is extensively used. "If the needle
hadn't been contaminated, the patient would not have
acquired hepatitis." "If you hadn't been exposed to asbes-
tos, you would not have contracted mesothelioma." Many
of the epidemiological study designs have counterfactual
thinking embodied [5]. In cohort studies we compare
exposed and unexposed individuals for a certain risk fac-
tor. The unexposed group can be viewed as "what if this
exposure did not occur". When calculating the attributa-
ble risk fraction, also called the etiological fraction, we
assume that all association between the exposure studied
and the outcome is causal, and in addition imply that if
not the exposed group had been exposed, the rate of out-
come among them would have been at the same level as
among the unexposed.
Necessary, sufficient and complex conditions (determinism)
Many conditions are necessary for an event to occur.
Every time the event occurs, the condition is present. A
necessary condition for septicaemia is that one has blood;
however, we do not say that having blood is the cause of
sepsis. Owning the axe, which a person steals to kill a
man, does not make you a murderer, even though the axe
was a necessary condition for the man's death. This leads
to the claim that causation is not given by the necessary
conditions, although they are important, because if we
can eliminate the necessary conditions, we can eliminate
the problem.
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Some conditions are sufficient to result in another: every
time they occur, something else happens. Drinking a cup
of hydrogen cyanide is a sufficient condition for death.
However, other conditions may also result in the effect;
not all deaths result from drinking hydrogen cyanide.
In complex situations many factors contribute to an effect,
and there are logistic problems in that an event occurs
some but not all times a constellation of factors occurs. To
overcome this, Mackie introduced the so-called INUS con-
dition of causation. An INUS condition for some effect is
an Insufficient but Non-redundant part of an Unnecessary
but Sufficient condition [26]. The NESS test described
above is a clarification or specific instance of an INUS con-
dition [23].
Determinism and probabilism
Causal determinism is based on the idea that that every
event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions
together with the laws of nature [27]. According to causal
determinism the causal relationships are invariant: Every
time a certain configuration of conditions occurs, the out-
come will be the same. We may have causal determinism
even if the situation is complex and the outcome is hard
to predict.
Probabilistic causality on the other hand claims that the
causal relationship is probabilistic, and not invariant.
That is, the outcome (effect) may vary according to prob-
ability distribution. Probabilistic theories of causation
state that causes raise the probabilities of their effects [9].
In epidemiology, probabilistic approaches are most often
used in the conceptual thinking of a relationship and in
the statistical testing of the strength of association [9].
Here, Hill's set of nine viewpoints to explain the associa-
tion between two variables are commonly used [3]. Only
the one of temporal sequence of association is essential.
This list of "Guidelines for causation" is more in tune with
modern epidemiological science as they emphasize the
strength of association rather than pure mechanical deter-
minism. However, many have criticised Hill's list and in
recent years there has been a resurge in the debate about
causality [6-8,10,28]. Moreover, probabilistic graphical
methods, such as Bayesian networks, may also be used in
order to represent the probabilistic independencies
between variables.
Causation in the Dent-O-Sept case
We have now presented theories for causation, which can
now be applied in a specific case, the Dent-O-Sept out-
break in Norway in 2002 [1,2].
Necessary and sufficient conditions
The P. aeruginosa bacterium is not a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for the death of people. Neither is its pres-
ence in the production plant a necessary and sufficient
condition for the presence of the bacteria in the product.
Hence, if necessary and sufficient conditions are required
for liability and moral responsibility, no one is responsi-
ble for the outbreak. Was the P. aeruginosa bacterium a
necessary condition?
For patients involved in the Dent-O-Sept outbreak, having
the outbreak strain of P. aeruginosa was necessary to be
included as a case. If it was not for the P. aeruginosa, then
there would have been no outbreak (i.e. "but-for"). But
this is more a definition criterion for being a case and does
not explain why the patient harboured this strain.
No single factor was absolutely required to be colonised
or infected with the outbreak strain. The use of Dent-O-
Sept was not a necessary condition for infection. Approx-
imately one third of the cases had not used the swab
directly. The outbreak investigators concluded that they
probably were secondarily infected from contaminated
environment or health care workers after the contami-
nated swabs had introduced the strain in the hospital
environment. By including this indirect pathway, it is rea-
sonable to claim that the contaminated swabs were a nec-
essary condition for the patients to become infected. This
is equivalent to outbreaks of gastroenteritis (e.g. salmo-
nellosis) where the primary cases may be infected by con-
taminated food, but cases continue to occur by person to
person transmission via the fecal-oral route even after the
implicated food item has been removed. In these situa-
tions, we would usually say that the food contamination
caused the whole outbreak, and not only the first cases.
P. aeruginosa is harmless to most people and in most
instances. The large majority of patients with the outbreak
strain of P. aeruginosa and all who died from the infection
had severe underlying illnesses. To have a severe underly-
ing illness was in practice a necessary condition to die
from the outbreak strain. So, both the presence of P. aeru-
ginosa in Dent-O-Sept and having an underlying illness
were necessary conditions for dying from the infection.
But there were other necessary conditions as well, such as
being hospitalised, but this we would hardly call a cause
of death. This illustrates the problem with necessary con-
ditions: there are extremely many of them.
In the Dent-O-Sept outbreak no single condition was suf-
ficient to result in infection with the outbreak strain.
Given the large number of Dent-O-Sept swabs used in the
period and the massive contamination, we believe that
several thousand patients were exposed to the outbreak
strain of P. aeruginosa. Only a few of them became last-
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ingly colonised or infected. Hence, the contaminated
Dent-O-Sept swab was not a sufficient condition for the
outbreak of the infection.
We may visualise a chain of unfortunate events necessary
for the outbreak to occur: The outbreak investigation dis-
cerned the direction of flow of the P. aeruginosa bacteria
from the production to the patients (figure 2). Can the
links of this chain be seen as a series of necessary condi-
tions that together are sufficient for the outbreak? How-
ever, the (necessary) conditions, such as the presence of P.
aeruginosa in the mouth swabs and the patients' suscepti-
bility, are not sufficient for the outbreak. There will not be
an outbreak every time these conditions occur. Applying
the concept of the INUS condition is helpful [26]. Using
contaminated swabs was in itself insufficient but non-
redundant, but together with other factors like the suscep-
tibility of the patients, the infectious dose, and underlying
illnesses, became sufficient to infect or colonise the
patient.
According to this approach to causality we can find the
altogether necessary and sufficient conditions for an
event. If we know the conditions (making up the cause),
the effect will occur. However, the challenge is that we do
not know all the conditions and their complex interplay.
For instance, we do not know the importance of the water
quality during production or the significance of the reuse
of the Dent-O-Sept for the outbreak.
Hill's postulates
In the Dent-O-Sept case, most of the points on Hill's list
are helpful in order to claim association, at least to a cer-
tain degree (table 1). In addition to the traditional epide-
miological measures of strength of association modern
microbiology has developed tools to demonstrate associ-
ations. Various techniques of producing "fingerprints" of
bacterial DNA have made it possible to identify identical
strains of bacteria. In outbreak investigations these tech-
niques have become very important to connect events and
claim causality, and are similar to detection of human
DNA in criminal investigations. When genotypically iden-
tical bacterial isolates were detected in the production
plant, in some of the swabs and in the affected patients,
we concluded that contamination of the production line
caused the outbreak.
Key actors
We will now in some more detail analyse key actors (table
2) and events in the light of causation and prepare for the
next section on moral responsibility.
The producer, Snøgg AS had a routine for cleaning and
disinfecting the production line but had no quality assur-
ance (QA) systems in place to control the production and
verifying that the product was safe. Having QA systems is
one of several requirements by Norwegian and EU law
[29] to be able to mark the product "CE" (Communauté
Européenne) which signifies that it complies with relevant
EU-regulations and indicates it being safe. Some years
prior to the outbreak, customers had periodically com-
plained about discoloured swabs. In 1999, the producer
commissioned an external evaluation and implemented
some, but not all the advice given; among the latter was
the advice to establish microbiological quality control of
the final product [17].
An audit of the producer revealed serious breaches of pro-
duction regulations [17]. Under strict liability, a party
breaking the law may be legally responsible irrespective of
whether any harm has been caused [24]. For instance,
driving under the influence of alcohol is in Norway as in
many other countries punishable by law even when no
one is harmed.
The presence of the outbreak strain in the production
facility was necessary for contamination to occur, but not
sufficient as not all swabs were contaminated. This dif-
fered even in swabs produced at the same time of day on
the same date. The main hypothesis of the outbreak inves-
The direction of flow of the Pseudomonas aeruginosa bacteria from the production to the patientsFigure 2
The direction of flow of the Pseudomonas aeruginosa bacteria from the production to the patients.
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tigation team was that bacteria-containing biofilm was
randomly shed from the production equipment into the
swab wraps [2]. Using the judicial, counterfactual "but-
for" test: "But-for the absence of a microbiological quality
control of the production equipment and the final prod-
uct, would the contamination have been detected earlier
and the outbreak avoided?" There is good reason to
believe so. A total of 76 of 1565 swabs examined during
the outbreak investigation contained the outbreak strain
of P. aeruginosa, and more than 250 swabs (16%) con-
tained one or more microbes (including the outbreak
strain), also in swabs produced years before the Dent-O-
Sept outbreak started [2]. Consequently, not abiding by
the requirement to have QA systems including an effective
microbiological control system can be seen as a cause in
the legal sense for this outbreak to occur. The same goes if
we apply a counterfactual NESS test.
The P. aeruginosa bacterium was also detected in a rubber
hose leading from a water tap supplied with municipal
water to a large steel tank used in the production [2]. In a
press release the producer claimed that the municipal
water company caused the outbreak [30]. This claim of
the origin of the first bacterium could in retrospect not be
verified. However, there are no requirements for tap water
to be Pseudomonas or bacteria free. On the contrary, it is
common microbiological knowledge that P. aeruginosa at
times can be detected in water and soil [31,32]. The bacte-
ria could have originated from other sources and contam-
inated the rubber hose. Using the "but-for" test on the
water supply fails to show it to be a cause-in-fact due to
the uncertainty of the origin of the first bacteria. Likewise,
due to the uncertainty of the origin it fails a counterfactual
NESS test. Hence, bacteria in the tap water cannot be seen
as a legal cause of the outbreak.
Many of the hospitals had several deficiencies in their QA
systems, for instance concerning the selection of which
products to purchase; the actual procurement of the prod-
uct; the logistic system for reception, distribution, storage,
and use of the product [33]. Many of these deficiencies are
in breach of national guidelines and legal regulations but
did probably not have any influence on this particular
outbreak. The bacterial load inside the wrap probably
diminished over time as the bacteria cannot survive with-
out oxygen. Consequently, the deficient logistics systems
in the hospitals appear not to be a cause-in-fact of this
outbreak. However, competent procurers in hospitals
might have detected inferior products or the lack of docu-
mentation, such as the declaration of conformity which is
required for all CE marked medical devices with the EU
directive [29].
Table 1: Application of Hill's viewpoints on the causal association between the Dent-O-Sept swab and becoming colonised or infected 
during the outbreak
Hill's viewpoints Application on the Dent-O-Sept outbreak
1. Strength of association Strong.
Association for having used the swab during hospitalisation and having the outbreak strain of P. aeruginosa, 
adjusted odds ratio 5.3.
Detecting genotypically identical strains of the bacterium in patients, the product and in the production 
facility [1]
2. Consistency of association Yes, to a large extent.
However, other co-factors also needed to be in place, e.g. contamination of the particular swab and a 
susceptible patient. Due to secondary spread in the hospitals also patients who did not use the swab were 
infected.
3. Specificity of association Yes, mostly.
Use of contaminated swabs led to colonisation and some times to infection. Necessary co-factors were as 
above (2). The clinical manifestations of the P. aeruginosa infection varied widely.
4. Temporal sequence of association Yes.
However, the outbreak strain of the bacteria was found in six patients before the production of the first 
contaminated batch of swabs was detected [2].
When the swabs were withdrawn from the marked the number of cases gradually diminished and 
disappeared.
5. Biological gradient This was not tested but assumed. Reuse of the swabs may have increased the bacterial load and hence the 
risk of becoming infected.
6. Plausibility of association Yes.
The chain from contamination during production to infection is well described.
7. Coherence of association Yes.
There is no other hypothesis of explanations for the outbreak.
8. Experiment (reversibility) Yes, a natural experiment.
When the source was removed the number of cases gradually diminished to zero.
9. Analogy Yes.
There are many other outbreaks caused by medical devices. (References in [1])
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Health care workers (HCWs) are constantly told to be
economical and prudent in the use of medical equipment.
In many hospitals it was customary to reuse the swab in
the same patient although it was clearly marked as single
use equipment. In between cleaning the patient's mouth
the swab was sometimes stored in a glass of water on the
patient's night stand. This practice allowed rapid multipli-
cation of bacteria on the swab. This unprescribed use did
not introduce the bacteria in swabs and hence in patients
where it had not already been, but probably increased the
bacterial load. An increase in bacterial load increases the
risk of infecting a contaminated patient and of causing a
more serious disease. "But-for" the improper use of the
swab, the same number of patients would be exposed to
the P. aeruginosa bacteria, but probably fewer would have
been colonised and probably fewer colonised patients
would have contracted serious infections. Together with
the introduction of the outbreak strain into the hospitals
and the susceptibility of the patients, the reuse of the
swabs can be seen as a necessary (non-redundant) condi-
tion or as a counterfactual conditional. Moreover, the
improper use of the swab may fail a but-for-test (due to
joint determination), but not a NESS-test. Hence, it is not
clear that HCWs behavior caused the outbreak in a legal
sense.
Hospital reporting systems for faulty medical equipment
are not the same for all types of equipment. A general atti-
tude among HCWs is that reporting is fruitless and not
really necessary, especially for minor products like mouth
swabs. During the investigation we learnt that several
HCWs had detected discoloured or otherwise faulty swabs
without reporting the event. It is worth noting that the
notification of faulty swabs by an infection control nurse
contributed to solving the outbreak quicker.
Table 2: The main participants in the Dent-O-Sept outbreak and some of their roles, responsibilities and actions.
Participant Role and responsibilities
The producer
"Snøgg AS"
• Produced the Dent-O-Sept swab
• Did not adhere to the laws and regulations for production of medical devices
• Lacked a quality assurance system for the production
• Did not implement advise after external evaluation
• Stopped the swab production as soon as the connection with the outbreak was 
established
The water supplier
"Kristiansand municipality"
• Supplied drinking water to the producer
• The P. aeruginosa bacterium may have been introduced into the production plant 
with the water
The hospitals • Treated patients and procured medical devices
• Many lacked quality assured systems for procurement, storage and use of medical 
devices
• Many lacked systems for training of health care workers
• Many had inadequate reporting systems for faulty medical devices
The health care workers • Treated and cared for patients
• Many reused the "single use" swabs contrary to the text on the wrap
• Many did not report faulty medical devices
The patients • Received medical treatment and care
• Many were seriously ill and susceptible for contracting infections with the P. 
aeruginosa bacterium
The surveyor and investigator
"Norwegian Institute of Public Health"
• Responsible for surveillance of infectious diseases and for outbreak investigations
• There is no national surveillance system for P. aeruginosa infections
National administrative body
"The Norwegian Directorate for Health and Social Affairs"
• Responsible for national administration within certain areas of the health care 
system
• Responsible for the audit of the producer
• Ignored the deadline to appeal the police's decision not to press charges.
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"But-for" the lack of reporting it is impossible to ascertain
whether the outbreak would have been detected earlier as
it depends on many other factors like what was reported,
how it was reported in the system and what measures
where taken following a report. In a probabilistic or risk
assessment approach, low threshold reporting systems
with appropriate follow-up routines and adequate surveil-
lance systems, make it more likely that the contaminated
swabs and the outbreak would have been detected earlier
(counterfactual).
Surveillance systems are in place for many infectious dis-
eases, but not for Pseudomonas infections [34]. Only the
most prevalent or serious diseases are included into the
surveillance systems after weighing factors such as costs
and preventability. When the computer systems improve,
more infections can be included at no or little extra cost.
As concluded in the previous paragraph, had an adequate
surveillance system for the P. aeruginosa bacterium or
some of the infections it caused been in place, it is more
likely that the outbreak could have been detected earlier.
However, the main importance of reporting systems for
faulty equipment and surveillance systems is that of pre-
paredness. Had the swabs not been contaminated, imper-
fect reporting and surveillance systems do not add to the
risk of causing outbreaks like unclean production of med-
ical equipment does (counterfactual).
The outbreak investigation was a necessary condition to
stop the outbreak. Could the number of patients affected
have been smaller if the investigation had been carried out
differently? During the investigation there was a tremen-
dous pressure to find the solution quickly. A rushed inves-
tigation might have resulted in not detecting the cause or
getting the results wrong, whereas a broad, systematic
investigation might have taken too long causing unneces-
sary sufferings and deaths. As two of the authors of this
article (BGI and PA) were responsible for the outbreak
investigation [1,2] we are not competent to appraise the
investigation.
In conclusion, many factors contributed to the outbreak
and its eventual dimension. The main necessary condition
for the outbreak was the contamination of the swabs in
the production facility. The size of the outbreak measured
in the number of patients affected and how long it lasted
are due to several additional factors. The breaches of reg-
ulations by the producer of the swabs play an important
role probably together with the reuse of the swabs in the
hospital, i.e. they are conditions that are influencing the
size of the outbreak. With a regulatory correct production
of the swabs in the production facilities there would have
been no outbreak (necessary condition). The reuse of the
swabs in the hospitals and the non-optimal production
probably increased the size of the outbreak (probabilistic
factor). In addition, other factors that might have an influ-
ence are the lack of adequate reporting and surveillance
systems.
Moral responsibility
Many people suffered in the outbreak. Seventy-one people
with the outbreak strain died while hospitalised, and for
at least 34 the investigators concluded that the P. aerugi-
nosa infection probably contributed to the death. No one
was found criminally liable. Several actors were in a posi-
tion where they could have known and acted differently,
and hence, are to be seen as morally responsible. In the
discussion on causes for the outbreak two main actors
emerged in the discussion on responsibility. One is the
producer Snøgg AS. The other is the group of HCWs who
reused the swabs and the hospital system permitting these
acts or possibly even encouraging them. What is their
moral responsibility?
Traditionally, medical errors have been divided into three:
Unintentional error, intentional error and random mis-
haps. In addition, bad outcomes may happen without
error [35]. For our discussion we will only focus on unin-
tentional error as no one in this outbreak ever was sus-
pected of intentionally wanting to cause harm.
Unintentional error can be caused by lack of knowledge,
lack of skill or non-application of relevant knowledge or
skill.
The producer Snøgg produces a wide range of medical
equipment useful for saving lives and reducing suffering.
The Dent-O-Sept swab had been produced for decades
and was in great demand. Their vision statement is "gjøre
det enkelt å hjelpe" [Make it simple to help] http://
www.snogg.no. In all their appearances the producer gave
no impression of intending to harm anyone, and from a
virtue-ethical standpoint, the company appeared favoura-
bly (see endnote 1). When the connection between the
swab and the outbreak was detected, the director of Snøgg
was devastated for what his product had caused [36,37].
Some months later the company started to focus more on
other factors influencing the outbreak. One of their new
initiatives was to partly blame the outbreak on the intro-
duction of the P. aeruginosa bacterium into the production
facilities through the municipal water pipe [30]. Another
was to draw the attention to the incorrect use of the swabs
in hospitals [38]. The company is expected to know that
they needed to have systems in place to stop bacteria in
municipal tap water from reaching the end product.
The impetus not to harm patients ("Primum non nocere"
– "First do no harm" ascribed to Hippocrates) and to care
for the vulnerable are duties with strong deontologic bear-
ings (see endnote 2). The duty to acquire necessary knowl-
edge for the safe performance of health care services, as
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well as being precautious appear to be part of such a per-
spective. Hence, the actions of the producer (as well as the
health care professionals) appear to breach with basic
deontological bearings in health care. Moreover, if the
moral norms of the producer's responsibilities are ade-
quately regulated by law, breaking these legal regulations,
such as the Act on medical devices [39], would in most
cases be a breach with the moral duties of a producer.
The Dent-O-Sept mouth swab belongs to Medical device
Class 1, which includes most non-invasive medical
devices according to the European Council Directive 93/
42/EEC [29]. The directive states that the devices must,
when used, "not compromise the clinical condition or the
safety of patients". "The devices and manufacturing proc-
esses must be designed in such a way as to eliminate or
reduce as far as possible the risk of infection to the patient,
user and third parties." Accordingly, the Council Directive
represents a consequentialist approach (see endnote 3).
The producer did not abide by the laws and regulations
relevant to him, and thus ignoring relevant norms and rel-
evant consequences.
The unintended error of producing contaminated swabs
appears only to a small extent to result from lack of
knowledge. The producer knew there had been problems
in the production and had received advice on implement-
ing QA systems which the producer had not followed in
great detail. By not doing so there appears to be a non-
application of relevant knowledge which would normally
be characterized as negligent and culpable. However,
there probably was a lack of knowledge about how bacte-
ria can contaminate the production equipment. The Dent-
O-Sept swab was the only moist item Snøgg produced.
Had the microbiological quality control measures been
implemented, this would probably have been revealed
and harm could have been avoided. In addition, there
probably also was some lack of skill in cleaning and dis-
infecting the wet part of production.
Hence, the outbreak was not a result of wilful or inten-
tional error. However, the non-adherence to norms and
regulations and the non-application or non-acquisition of
knowledge can be conceived of as malpractice. It is not the
case that science has not yet progressed enough, or that
there are limitations in the predictive nature of knowledge
with regards to the particular case [35].
The health care workers aim at saving lives and alleviate
pain and suffering. Their work is legally regulated by laws
and regulations, and professionally by guidelines, instruc-
tions and training. In addition, their actions are also to a
large degree guided by colleagues and the culture of the
workplace. One of the traditional Norwegian virtues of is
that of austerity. It can partly be ascribed to the nation's
economic poverty up until a few decades ago and to our
Lutheran tradition of modesty ("In the sweat of thy face
shalt thou eat bread", Genesis 3:19). This demand of
being economical is also reflected in the Act on health per-
sonnel [40] and in instructions from the hospital manage-
ment. Single use products are in conflict with being
economical. In several hospitals it was accepted or even
encouraged to reuse the swabs, possibly considering them
to be a variant of the tooth-brush. There is also a conse-
quentialist reasoning for this austerity: reduced cost com-
bined with low risk.
The Norwegian and English texts on the wrap were quite
different, and the Norwegian being the most ambiguous:
"Antiseptisk engangspensel for munnhygiene" which lit-
erarily translates to "Antiseptic one-time-swab for mouth
hygiene"; whereas the English text read: "Premoistened
foam swab for mouth hygiene". Although "engangs" usu-
ally is translated to "single use" some can also understand
it to be "single period-use" just like a single use syringe
can be used for multiple injections in the same patient
within a short time frame. To avoid possible misinterpre-
tations a resent amendment (05.09.2007) to the Euro-
pean Council Directive on Medical devices has defined a
"single use device" as "a device intended to be used once
only for a single patient". The claim of antiseptic proper-
ties of the swab (which was never documented by the pro-
ducers [17]) may have led some health care workers to
underestimate the risk this practise posed. Placing a swab
coated with an oral cavity bacterial flora in a glass of water
with saliva and mucus as nutrition, may lead to extensive
bacterial growth up to a concentration which makes it
potentially harmful. And no one could presume that the
swabs contained P. aeruginosa. In addition, there is an
active debate within the medical community in Europe
whether it can be safe to reuse reprocessed single use med-
ical equipment.
There were no guidelines against this practice and no
superiors contradicted it. From a virtue-ethical perspective
the act was ambiguous; it was austere, but against profes-
sional standards (of following written instructions) and
the duty to care for the patient. The main reason for the
medical error of reusing the swab was non-application or
misunderstanding of relevant information.
According to Norwegian law, hospital management shall
provide for making an infection control programme, pro-
ducing guidelines to prevent hospital acquired infections,
having a system for surveillance of infectious diseases and
for procurement and control of medical equipment. As
there were deficiencies in many of these fields in many
hospitals, the hospital management consequently appears
to be morally negligent and legally responsible according
to the NESS-test. When human error repetitively occurs
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within a system it is of interest to discuss whether to have
a person approach or a system approach. If preventing
future errors is the aim, a system approach appears to be
more rewarding [41]. However, even though responsibil-
ity of the management does not free the individual
employees from responsibility, it would be fruitless to try
to identify individual health care workers reusing the
swab and place them under moral and legal scrutiny.
After the Dent-O-Sept swab was withdrawn from the mar-
ket, other similar products have taken its place. Despite all
the media attention from this outbreak, we have received
anecdotal information that health care workers still reuse
single use mouth swabs.
Legal consequences
At least 231 patients contracted the bacterium and for at
least 34 patients the investigators concluded that the P.
aeruginosa infection probably contributed to the patient's
death. There was much anxiety and guilt feeling among
patients and relatives. Many had cared for their terminally
ill relatives and used the Dent-O-Sept swab. Some called
the Norwegian Institute of Public Health and asked for
example: "Did I kill my mother by using the swab?"
No one was made criminally liable after this outbreak.
The police started an investigation of the producer but
decided not to press charges. The Norwegian Directorate
for Health and Social Affairs appealed the decision several
months after the time limit for appeal had expired; hence
the Attorney-General could not reopen the case [42,43].
Norsk pasientskadeerstatning (NPE, the Norwegian Sys-
tem of Compensation to Patients) grants monetary com-
pensation mainly for economical loss and to some degree
for permanent disablement due to injury inflicted as a
result of treatment in public health services in Norway
[44,45]. Few patients could document economical loss
because they were, among other things, elderly, disabled,
not working, had severe chronic diseases or were already
severely injured e.g. after serious car accidents.
By 18 February 2004, NPE had received a total of 287
claims. Of 256 claims processed 48 were accepted for
compensation and 2.3 million NOK ( 290 000 EUR) had
been awarded [46]. By June 2007 the total number of
processed claims was 291 of 292. NPE sent a claim for re-
compensation to the producer. In an out-of court settle-
ment dated 11 October 2005 the producer agreed to pay
NPE 1.2 million NOK ( 150 000 EUR) as a full and final
sum of any regress demand in connection with the mouth
swabs and without accepting responsibility for the out-
break (Deputy Director General R. G. Jørstad, NPE, per-
sonal communication).
In addition to the claim from NPE other civil claims were
made against the producer. One large hospital reached a
court settlement on 19 June 2006 with the producer and
received compensation amounting to 3.3 million NOK (
410 000 EUR) for additional costs incurred for prolonged
hospitalisations of patients and for preventing further
spread of the bacterium [47]. There may be other settle-
ments that not have been made public. Hence the total
known compensations paid by the producer amounts to
4.5 million NOK ( 560 000 EUR).
In jurisprudence responsibility is related to causality. To
be negligent in most instances requires to have caused the
harm. In this article we have argued that the contamina-
tion of the Dent-O-Sept swab was a necessary (non-redun-
dant) condition for colonising and infecting the
individual patients and by this "caused" the outbreak.
Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that if sys-
tematic microbiological sampling of the product as part of
a QA system had been in place, microbial contamination
of the product would have been detected. That is, accord-
ing to counterfactual probabilistic reasoning, the
neglected QA system "caused" the outbreak. This claim
uses both deterministic arguments (swab causes out-
break) and probabilistic reasoning (the probability that a
microbiological QA system will detect the contamina-
tion). In addition many other factors contributed to the
number of patients being affected (the extent of the out-
break), like the susceptibility of each individual patient
being exposed, the reuse of the swab by HCWs and the
hospital attitude for accepting reuse of swabs, to name a
few. Several of these factors can be interpreted as INUS
conditions and also play a role in applying Hill's nine
viewpoints in claiming a causal association between the
swab and Pseudomonas infection (table 1). The case also
illustrates the weaknesses of the "but-for" test (with
regards to assessment of cause-in-fact) as there were many
concurrent factors that cannot be differentiated as neces-
sary for the event, they were only necessary elements
(NESS-test).
After establishing a cause-in-fact relationship, the proxim-
ity or adequacy of causes needs to be discussed. Whereas
the contamination of the swabs during production
appears to be an adequate cause, the possibility of the ori-
gin of the first bacterium through the municipal water
supply is not because it is neither illegal nor verified. In
addition, it precedes a "novus actus" which is the breech of
regulations in the production. It can be argued that the
reuse of the swabs in the hospitals is also proximate, at
least for some of the patients becoming infected during
the outbreak. Whether the individual HCW or the hospi-
tal system is responsible is open for debate [41].
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Why was no one criminally charged in this outbreak? We
have argued for a causal association between the contam-
inated swabs and Pseudomonas infection and death, and a
breech of regulations during production has been estab-
lished. However, the error was unintentional and due to a
non-application of relevant knowledge and skill; a knowl-
edge that isn't intuitively evident to everyone. The police
decided not to press charges. In a press release, the police
pointed at other circumstances, arguing that the health
authorities had not audited the producer prior to the out-
break, and that there were irregularities in the use of the
swabs in the hospitals and in the reporting of faulty med-
ical devices. In addition, the fact that the Directorate for
Health and Social Affairs did not appeal the decision until
too late blocked the possibility for a reinvestigation of the
case due to the procedures described in the Criminal Pro-
cedure Act.
Conclusion
The major necessary condition causing the outbreak was
the contamination of the swabs in the production facility.
Without this contamination, the Dent-O-Sept outbreak
would not have happened. Hence, there exists a cause-in-
fact according to the but-for-test. Many other factors con-
tributed to the outbreak and the size of it, the reuse of the
single use swabs being the most important. The unin-
tended error – by the producer of the swabs and to a
minor extent by the hospital practice – was mainly due to
non-application of relevant knowledge and skills, and
breaches with moral duties as professionals, constituting
moral negligence.
In epidemiology, other sciences, philosophy and jurispru-
dence there are plenty of methods and theories to explain
causality and responsibility in complex situations like
outbreak investigations. Applying different theories from
different disciplines on the various necessary and suffi-
cient conditions and the roles and responsibilities of the
participants, is useful and important to elucidate the com-
plex from most angles. From an outbreak investigator's
viewpoint no theory is the only correct one. Using
Mackie's concept of INUS conditions and Hill's nine view-
points of claiming a causal association, applying deter-
ministic as well as probabilistic ways of reasoning, all
shed light on the issues of causality in this outbreak. Med-
ical practice and jurisprudence is closely connected in real
life as professional negligence can have legal conse-
quences. Cases in epidemiology, such as outbreak investi-
gation, highlight the tension both in science and
jurisprudence between general causality and the causality
of specific events. Moreover, applying legal theories of
causation (counterfactual reasoning and the "but-for" test
or the NESS test) proved important perspectives on the
Dent-O-Sept outbreak.
As shown for the outbreak of P. aeruginosa infection the
issue of causality also serves as a starting point for the
debate on legal responsibility. Due to criminal procedure
laws and other factors outside the discourse of causality,
no one was criminally charged for the outbreak.
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Endnotes
Endnote 1
Virtue ethics is a branch of moral philosophy that empha-
sizes character as the key element of ethical thinking,
rather than rules or consequences.
Endnote 2
Deontological ethics, deontology or duty-based-ethics is
an approach to ethics that focuses on the rightness or
wrongness of actions themselves, as opposed to the right-
ness or wrongness of the consequences of those actions.
The term deontology stems from Greek: deon () which
means obligation or duty.
Endnote 3
Consequentialism refers to those moral theories which
hold that the basis for any valid moral judgment about an
action is the consequences of the particular action.
Accordingly a morally right action is an action that pro-
duces good consequences.
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Summary Objective: Pseudomonas aeruginosa is an opportunistic pathogen that may cause
invasive disease. We describe the epidemiology of invasive P. aeruginosa infection in Norway
and identify associated clinical factors.
Methods: All patients with invasive P. aeruginosa and Pseudomonas not identiﬁed at the spe-
cies level (Pseudomonas spp.) in Norway 1992e2002 were included. Detailed information was
collected for all cases during 1999e2002. Population and health institution statistics were
obtained from national databases.
Results: In 1999e2002 the incidence rate was 3.16 per 100 000 person-years at risk or 0.20 per
1000 hospital stays. For hospital-acquired infection the rate was 671 per 100 000 person-years
as compared with 1.13 for community-acquired infection, and 37 in nursing homes. The highest
risk for invasive Pseudomonas disease was found in patients with malignant neoplasms of lym-
phoid and haematopoietic tissue (risk per 1000 hospital stays 1.9; 95% CI 1.5e2.3) and other dis-
eases of blood and blood-forming organs (2.2; 95% CI 1.2e3.7). The case fatality rate was 35%.
Conclusions: The incidence of invasive P. aeruginosa infection in this population-based study
was much lower than in most single-hospital studies. The nationwide study design and prudent
antibiotic use may explain some of the difference. Infection risk is strongly associated with cer-
tain underlying diseases.
ª 2008 The British Infection Society. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Pseudomonas aeruginosa, a gram-negative aerobic bacte-
rium with minimal nutritional requirements, is common in
moist environments.1,2 It rarely causes infection in healthy
humans but may do so following disruption of physical bar-
riers and in patients with certain underlying illnesses.1e3
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P. aeruginosa produces several virulence-associated fac-
tors and can cause a variety of disease manifestations. In
addition to bacteraemia and endocarditis, infection of the
urinary tract, respiratory tract, central nervous system,
ear, eye, bone, joints and skin are most often reported.1e5
Bioﬁlm formation is an important factor in disease persis-
tence for example in patients with cystic ﬁbrosis.6 Pseudo-
monas species is ranked among the top 10 causes of
bacteraemias in hospitals.7e12 In-hospital crude case, fatal-
ity from invasive disease is high, ranging from 18% to
61%.4,13e23 Pseudomonas species other than P. aeruginosa
infrequently cause infection.24
Little is known about the epidemiology of invasive P.
aeruginosa infection in humans in Norway as these infec-
tions are not covered by national surveillance systems.
Only one hospital has instituted screening of all patients be-
ing admitted to the intensive care unit (ICU) after a local
outbreak.25
During the investigation and follow-up of a large national
outbreak of P. aeruginosa infection in 2001e2002,26,27 we
collected detailed information on all laboratory-conﬁrmed
invasive infections in the country. The objective of this
study was to describe the epidemiology of invasive P. aeru-
ginosa infection in Norway, and to identify patient groups
at increased risk of disease and of death from P. aeruginosa
infection. In contrast to earlier published studies, this is
a population-based study that includes all hospitals in
a country. By using complete hospital statistics, we are
able to estimate national incidence rates and mortality
rates of P. aeruginosa infections by groups of underlying
diseases.
Materials and methods
A case of invasive P. aeruginosa infection was deﬁned as
a patient with P. aeruginosa or Pseudomonas not identiﬁed
at the species level (Pseudomonas spp.) isolated from blood
or cerebrospinal ﬂuid (CSF) during the period 1992e2002. In
June 2002, we asked all 22 medical microbiological labora-
tories in Norway to supply lists with name, unique personal
identiﬁcation number and certain other speciﬁed informa-
tion for all cases and to continue prospective reporting until
the end of 2002. The laboratories used their standard diag-
nostic methods; a few based their identiﬁcation on colony
characteristics only. As a recommended routine, two sets
of blood cultures are taken from two separate puncture
sites. Each set comprises two bottles, usually one aerobic
and one anaerobic, each drawing up to 10 ml blood.28 Avail-
able cultures from 1999 to 2002 were genotyped to identify
cases with the outbreak strain.26
For patients diagnosed during 1999e2002 we asked the
patients’ physicians to complete a form containing ques-
tions on type of Pseudomonas infection according to
national deﬁnitions,29 potential risk factors, discharge diag-
noses (free space on the questionnaire, up to 10 diagnoses
were recorded in the database), sequelae (including
death), and administrative information, including name,
the unique personal identiﬁcation number, name and type
of health institution, transfer from other institutions and
the dates of admission, discharge, microbiological sampling
and death.
Cases, who had been admitted to a hospital 48 h be-
fore collection of the samples that harboured Pseudomo-
nas, were deﬁned as having a hospital-acquired infection
(HAI). Those living in or having been hospitalised from a
nursing home (NH) for the elderly <48 h before the samples
were taken, were deﬁned as having nursing home-acquired
infection (NHAI). The remainder we had information was
deﬁned as having community-acquired infection (CAI).
Population statistics and the number of beds in NHs were
downloaded from Statistics Norway (www.ssb.no). The
number of stays and the number of days of hospitalisation
in somatic hospitals by region, age and discharge diagnoses
(main and up to seven subordinate discharge diagnoses)
were supplied by The Norwegian Patient Register (www.
shdir.no/norsk_pasientregister/), a public service organisa-
tion supplying ofﬁcial hospital statistics.
We selected several disease categories that have been
shown to be associated with increased risk of invasive P.
aeruginosa infection1,24 and grouped them according to
ICD-10 (International Classiﬁcation of Diseases, 10th Revi-
sion).30 We calculated the incidence proportion of in-hospi-
tal infection and in-hospital death for these disease groups,
using the number of Pseudomonas cases and deaths within
each diagnosis category as numerator, and the number of
patients discharged from hospital with a diagnosis in the
same group as denominator. To identify risk factors for dy-
ing among the cases we performed stepwise multivariate
binomial regression analyses including the following vari-
ables in the initial model: age; gender; year and month of
diagnosis; clinical Pseudomonas diagnosis; surgical, immu-
nosuppressive, antibiotic or ventilator treatment; ICU ad-
mittance; place of acquisition and having an underlying
risk diagnosis.
We entered all patient data in an Epi Info version 6.04d
database and analysed them in Epi Info, Excel, Episheet and
Stata 8 and 9 statistical softwares. The Norwegian Institute
of Public Health (NIPH) was authorised by the Norwegian
Board of Health to perform the study as part of the
investigation of a nationwide outbreak.26 The Data Inspec-
torate gave permission to create a database to store the
information. Extensive efforts were made to ensure com-
pleteness and quality of data, including linkage with the
National Population Registry to search for deaths among
the patients.
Results
Incidence 1992e2002
We identiﬁed 1174 cases over the 11-year period, of which
1079 (92%) had isolates of P. aeruginosa and 95 had Pseudo-
monas not identiﬁed at the species level (Pseudomonas
spp.), resulting in an overall incidence rate of 2.43 per
100 000 person-years at risk (pyar). As other species of
Pseudomonas only infrequently cause disease,24 we will in
the analysis below assume that all were cases of P. aerugi-
nosa infection.
The patients’ age ranged from 13 days to 100 years
(median 72 years) and 67% were male. The age and gender
distribution did not change much over the years. Nearly all
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patients had a blood isolate, four had only a CSF isolate,
while two had both.
During the study period there was a small but signiﬁcant
increase in the incidence, averaging 0.18 cases per 100 000
pyar for each year. However, data were not available from
four of the 22 laboratories in 1992, three in 1993, two in
1994, and one in the ﬁrst half of 1995. The monthly number
of cases varied from ﬁve to 27 (Fig. 1).
The following detailed analysis is restricted to the 567
cases from 1999 to 2002.
Incidence, case fatality and mortality by age and
gender, 1999e2002
For the period 1999e2002, 567 incident cases (representing
565 patients) were identiﬁed, corresponding to an
incidence rate of 3.16 per 100 000 pyar (95% CI, 2.90e
3.43) (Table 1). In hospitals the incidence rate was 3.33
per 100 000 person-days (95% CI, 3.06e3.62), or 0.20 per
1000 hospital stays (95% CI, 0.18e0.21). Both morbidity
and mortality increased with age (Table 1).
Two patients were included twice with different epi-
sodes of bacteraemia three and nine months apart. Only
three patients had isolates from CSF, of whom two had
hydrocephalus and one had a lumbar drain. One patient was
in a NH located in a hospital building when diagnosed and is
included in the numerator for hospital rates. One hundred
and ninety nine (35%) cases died while hospitalised
(Table 1).
The rate of infection was 5.1 per 100 000 person-days in
hospital in males and 1.9 in females (385 males and 182
females) (incidence rate ratio [IRR], 2.6; 95% CI, 2.2e3.1).
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Figure 1 The monthly number of cases (40 cases (gray bars) belonged to an outbreak caused by a contaminated mouth swab26,27)
of invasive P. aeruginosa infection in Norway 1992e2002.
Table 1 The incidence and mortality of invasive P. aeruginosa infection by place of acquisition and age group in Norway
1999e2002
Age group Cases (and deaths) by place of acquisition CFR
(%)a
Incidence of all cases
per 100 000
Mortality of all
cases per 100 000
CAI HAI NHAI Unknown Total Pop. yrs Hosp. days Pop. yrs Hosp. days
0e9 years 3 (1) 4 (2) 7 (3) 43 0.29 0.52 0.12 0.22
10e19 years 0 (0) 6 (0) 6 (0) 0 0.27 1.29 0.00 0.00
20e29 years 6 (0) 9 (2) 15 (2) 13 0.62 1.28 0.08 0.17
30e39 years 1 (0) 12 (0) 13 (0) 0 0.48 0.88 0.00 0.00
40e49 years 8 (1) 18 (5) 1 (0) 1 (0) 28 (6) 21 1.12 2.25 0.24 0.48
50e59 years 11 (4) 49 (20) 2 (0) 1 (0) 63 (24) 38 2.87 3.25 1.10 1.24
60e69 years 41 (12) 60 (22) 1 (0) 3 (1) 105 (35) 33 7.46 4.59 2.49 1.53
70e79 years 70 (26) 89 (49) 17 (3) 2 (1) 178 (79) 44 13.91 4.84 6.17 2.15
80e89 years 44 (15) 57 (22) 24 (6) 1 (0) 126 (43) 34 18.68 4.28 6.38 1.46
90 years 8 (1) 9 (2) 9 (4) 26 (7) 27 25.39 5.34 6.84 1.44
Total 192 (60) 313 (124) 54 (13) 8 (2) 567 (199) 35 3.16 3.33 1.11 1.17
a CFRZ case fatality rate; CAIZ community-acquired infection; HAIZ hospital-acquired infection; NHAIZ nursing home-acquired
infection.
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For hospital-acquired cases (221 males and 92 females) the
rates were 2.9 and 1.0 per 100 000, respectively (IRR, 3.0;
95% CI, 2.3e3.8). As with morbidity the overall in-hospital
mortality rates were also higher in males with 1.6 per
100 000 person-days in hospital in males and 0.8 in females
(122 males and 77 females) (incidence mortality rate ratio
[IRR], 2.0; 95% CI, 1.5e2.6). However, the overall case
fatality rate was higher in females, 42% vs. 32% in males
(fatality risk ratio [FRR] 1.3, 95% CI, 1.1e1.7). In a multi-
variate analysis, female gender was no longer associated
with an increased risk of dying among the cases.
Place of acquisition
Patients were diagnosed at 55 hospitals and one NH (one
patient), ranging from 1 to 70 cases per institution for the
4-year period. A total of 55% of the cases were hospital-
acquired and an additional 10% were living in or being
hospitalised from a NH. The remaining 34% were commu-
nity-acquired and 1% was unknown. The incidence was 671
per 100 000 pyar in hospital for hospital-acquired infection
as compared with 1.13 per 100 000 pyar for community-
acquired infection (IRR 627, 95% CI, 524e751). For people
living in NHs, the rate was 37 cases per 100 000 pyar
compared to 1.13 per 100 000 pyar for community-acquired
infection (IRR 18, 95% CI, 14e24).
For all cases, the median length of the total stay in
hospital was 15 days and the median time from the P. aer-
uginosa sample was taken to discharge was 13 days. For the
HAI cases, the time from admission to the culture was taken
varied from 2 to 107 days with a median of 11 days. For
those dying, the median time from diagnosis to death was
only 3 days.
Rates of community-acquired infection rose sharply
from the age of 60 years. For the hospital-acquired cases
the increasing infection rate with age started at a lower
age, and the age-related rates per 100 000 person-days in
hospital showed an almost two-tiered distribution with
a break point at 50 years (Fig. 2). The HAI rates for the
age groups 50þ years and 0e49 years were 2.3 and 0.86, re-
spectively, per 100 000 person-days in hospital (IRR, 2.7;
95% CI, 2.0e3.7).
Clinical features
Septicaemia was the most commonly reported clinical
manifestation (81%), followed by urinary tract infection
and pneumonia (Table 2). The two patients with isolates
from CSF had meningitis, and the one with isolates from
blood and CSF had septicaemia. Of the other reported diag-
noses, seven had infection in the gastrointestinal tract,
seven in the biliary system, one had pancreatitis, one endo-
carditis (in a patient with an artiﬁcial mitral valve), and
three patients were reported as only being colonised, de-
spite isolation of P. aeruginosa from their blood. The pri-
mary source of infection for the 460 cases classiﬁed as
having septicaemia was not available.
Of the patients with invasive P. aeruginosa infection,
14% received mechanical ventilation within a period of 3
weeks before the sample positive for P. aeruginosa was
taken, and 30% were admitted to an ICU during their stay
in the hospital.
The 268 patients who received antibiotic treatment
during the 3 weeks preceding sampling for P. aeruginosa,
received a total of 467 courses of antibiotics (mean 1.7
per patient, ranging from one to seven). Eighty-one pa-
tients (14%) received a total of 101 systemic antibiotics
within the ATC J01-group with activity against Pseudomo-
nas [CR 05 (piperacillin tazobactam), DD 02 (ceftazidime),
DH 02 (meropenem) and DH 51 (imipenem cilastatin), GB
01, 03 and 07 (tobramycin, gentamicin and netilmicin)
and MA 01 and 02 (oﬂoxacin and ciproﬂoxacin)]. No patient
was reported as having received DF 01 (monobactams) pre-
ceding their Pseudomonas infection.
Underlying disease and prior therapy
Patients with malignant neoplasms of lymphoid and haema-
topoietic tissue (ICD-10 categories30 C81eC96) and other
diseases of blood and blood-forming organs (D70eD77) had
the highest risk of invasive P. aeruginosa disease and of
dying from this infection while hospitalised (Table 3). The
highest case fatality rate was seen among patients with
transplanted organs (Z94) and patients with certain diseases
of the respiratory system (J10eJ22; J40eJ96) (Table 3).
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Figure 2 Invasive P. aeruginosa infection in Norway 1999e
2002 by age groups and place of acquisition (Community-ac-
quired infection (CAI), and hospital-acquired infection (HAI)).
Table 2 Clinical manifestations of invasive P. aeruginosa
infection in Norway 1999e2002
1999 2000 2001 2002 Total Deaths CFR
(%)a
Septicaemia 118 88 140 114 460 171 37
Pneumonia 7 6 9 11 33 17 52
Meningitis 1 0 0 2 3 2 67
Urinary tract
infection
9 7 11 15 42 2 5
Wound infection 4 0 0 3 7 0 0
Unknown 0 0 1 2 3 1 33
Other 5 5 5 4 19 6 32
Total 144 106 166 151 567 199 35
a CFRZ case fatality rate.
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In the multivariate regression analysis, the following
variables were independently associated with an increased
risk of dying (CFR) among the cases: Having one or more
underlying risk diagnoses listed in Table 3 (risk ratio [RR],
2.52; 95% CI, 1.50e4.25), admission to intensive care unit
at some time during the stay (RR, 1.55; 95% CI, 1.26e
1.91), being 60 years or older (RR, 1.53; 95% CI, 1.14e
2.06), and having received immunosuppressive treatment
within the past 3 weeks before the sample with P. aerugi-
nosa was taken (RR, 1.39; 95% CI, 1.13e1.73). Having
a Pseudomonas UTI as the most serious clinical
Pseudomonas diagnosis was highly protective (RR, 0.09;
95% CI, 0.01e0.63).
Using other deﬁnitions
We have repeated all major calculations for the period
1999e2002 in two alternative data sets: (1) omitting all
cases with Pseudomonas not identiﬁed at the species level
(50 cases), and (2) omitting all cases that were part of an
outbreak in 2001e2002 (40 cases). The omitted cases are
evenly distributed on factors like age groups, gender,
Table 3 Number of cases of P. aeruginosa invasive infection and in-hospital death and the total number of discharges by cer-
tain ICD-10 discharge diagnoses in Norway 1999e2002
ICD-10 categories (codes) Cases Deaths Discharges Cases Deaths
Riska 95% CI Riska 95% CI CFR (%)
Other diseases of blood and blood-
forming organs (D70eD77)
14 6 6333 2.2 1.2e3.7 0.9 0.3e2.1 43
Malignant neoplasms of lymphoid and
haematopoietic tissue (C81eC96)
94 41 49 685 1.9 1.5e2.3 0.8 0.6e1.1 44
Decubitus ulcer (L89) 7 2 4344 1.6 0.6e3.3 0.5 0.06e1.7 29
Human immunodeﬁciency virus [HIV]
disease (B20eB24)
3 1 1875 1.6 0.4e5.1 0.5 0.01e3.0 33
Injury of nerves and spinal cord
(S04; S14; S24; S34)
3 0 1915 1.6 0.3e4.6 0.0 e 0
Immunodeﬁciency with predominantly
antibody defects (D80)
1 0 640 1.6 0.08e7.7 0.0 e 0
Cystic ﬁbrosis (E84) 2 0 1373 1.5 0.2e5.3 0.0 e 0
Renal failure (N17eN19) and
Dependence on renal dialysis (Z99.2)
50 25 42 205 1.2 0.9e1.6 0.6 0.4e0.9 50
Transplanted organ and tissue
status (Z94)
9 6 8399 1.1 0.5e2.0 0.7 0.3e1.6 67
Burns and corrosions of external body
surface (T20eT25)
3 1 4046 0.7 0.2e2.2 0.2 0.01e1.4 33
Urolithiasis (N20eN23) 13 2 24 128 0.5 0.3e0.9 0.08 0.01e0.3 15
Certain diseases of the respiratory
system (J10eJ22; J40eJ96)
180 94 364 014 0.5 0.4e0.6 0.3 0.2e0.3 52
Malignant neoplasms (C00eC80) 137 57 367 817 0.4 0.3e0.4 0.2 0.1e0.2 42
Diabetes mellitus (E10eE14; O24) 46 14 149 299 0.3 0.2e0.4 0.1 0e0.2 30
Other medical care
(cancer treatment) (Z51)
16 4 77 268 0.2 0.1e0.3 0.05 0.01e0.1 25
Certain diseases of the circulatory
system (I20eI79)
147 69 813 978 0.2 0.1e0.2 0.09 0e0.1 47
Transport accidents (V) 2 0 16 729 0.1 0.02e0.4 0.0 e 0
Injuries. other (S00-S99)
(not ICD-10Z S04; S14; S24; S34)
20 8 293 564 0.06 0e0.1 0.03 0e0.05 40
Disorders related to short gestation
and low birth weight (P07)
1 0 24 804 0.04 0e0.2 0.0 e 0
Falls (W) 1 0 66 067 0.02 0e0.08 0.0 e 0
The number of risk diagnoses 751 330
The number of patients with one or
more risk diagnoses
462 184
The number of patients with none of
these risk diagnosis
105 15
All patients 567 199 2 904 940 0.2 0.18e0.21 0.07 0.06e0.08 35
CFRZ case fatality rate; 95% CIZ 95% conﬁdence interval.
a Incidence risk and mortality risk per 1000 discharges.
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clinical features, place of acquisition and underlying ill-
ness. The total incidence rate was then reduced from
0.20 per 1000 hospital stays to 0.18 in both the alternative
data sets.
An alternative mortality measure to the ‘‘in-hospital
death’’ used above is a ‘‘30 day case fatality rate’’.
Counting 30 days from the sampling date, 184 cases died
in hospital and an additional two after discharge, reducing
the CFR from 35% to 33%. There was no clear pattern
difference using either measure.
Discussion
In hospitalised patients and patients with underlying dis-
eases, invasive P. aeruginosa infection is an important
cause of disease and death. We have described the total
number of patients with P. aeruginosa isolated from blood
or CSF in Norway over an 11-year period. No previous study
has reported the risk of acquiring invasive P. aeruginosa in-
fection associated with speciﬁc underlying diseases at a na-
tional level. We found that both incidence of infection and
mortality are strongly associated with increasing age and
underlying disease.
Low overall incidence
For the period 1999e2002, we found a rate of invasive P.
aeruginosa infection of 0.20 per 1000 hospital stays. Studies
from other countries have indicated rates between 0.94
and 1.8 per 1000 hospital stays5,11,14e16,18,19,21 in tertiary
referral hospitals and university hospitals and 0.43 and
0.59 per 1000 hospital stays in community hospitals.9,10
Apart from our inclusion of patients with positive CSF cul-
tures, our inclusion criteria are very similar to the above-
mentioned studies and cannot explain the low rate. The
low incidence in Norway compared with studies from other
countries may partly be explained by study design. Our
study was nationwide and population-based and included
all somatic hospital stays in Norway. Certain hospital de-
partments such as dermatology and gynaecology and ob-
stetrics, and community or specialty hospitals with less
than 5000 discharges per year, are known to have low rates
of P. aeruginosa invasive infection so these departments
may have contributed to the low reported overall rates.
However, no Norwegian hospital had a higher rate than
0.42 per 1000 hospital stays.
Indiscriminate use of antibiotics, especially broad spec-
trum antibiotics, is known to be associated with develop-
ment of resistance and selection of resistant bacteria, such
as P. aeruginosa.1e3,24,31 One possible explanation for the
low rates of invasive P. aeruginosa infection observed in Nor-
waymaybeprudent use of antibiotics in hospitals. Compared
to hospitals in many other countries, Norwegian hospitals
have low overall antibiotic consumption and low use of broad
spectrum antibiotics. The use of narrow-spectrum drugs is
encouraged.32e34 For instance, penicillin is the preferred
choice for community-acquired uncomplicated pneumonia.
The use of empiric broad spectrum antibiotics such as most
3rd generation cephalosporins,whichmay give Pseudomonas
a selective advantage, are generally discouraged. For em-
piric treatment of septicaemia where broad spectrum
coverage is necessary, penicillin plus an aminoglycoside is
the recommended standard treatment in most hospital
departments. In general, aminoglycosides are active against
Pseudomonas and have a high threshold for development of
resistance (tobramycin considered most active), thereby
avoiding selection pressure favouring these bacteria.35
The importance of age and underlying disease
Our ﬁnding of 14% of the cases having received mechanical
ventilation, and 30% having been admitted to an ICU can be
compared with ﬁgures from 30 hospitals in the 2002 annual
report from The Norwegian Intensive Care Register (Norsk
intensivregister). Of the 3.4 million hospital-days, 0.73%
was spent on a ventilator and 1.4% in an ICU.36 These ﬁgures
indicate that being on a ventilator or being admitted to the
ICU increases the risk of acquiring invasive P. aeruginosa in-
fection by a factor of 20, which is in accordance with other
studies.4,14,17,18,20,21
Several risk factors for invasive P. aeruginosa infection
and death have previously been identiﬁed.1e4,14,17,18,20,21,37
Using complete national discharge statistics, we were
able to calculate absolute rates of infection among patients
with various underlying diseases. Our study conﬁrms that P.
aeruginosa infection is a major risk to patients with cancer,
immunodeﬁciency, renal failure and certain other diseases.
Several studies have shown that the incidence of
invasive P. aeruginosa infection increases with age, and
report mean and median ages between 54 and 70
years4,9,15,17,18,20,21; our ﬁndings are in the upper end of
that range. The lower age of hospital-acquired cases
(Fig. 2) may simply reﬂect more hospitalised patients
have underlying diseases irrespective of age while in the
general population the prevalence of underlying illnesses
increases sharply from the age of 60.
We found that the rates of hospital-acquired infection
are three times higher in males. Most studies show
a majority of infection in males, varying from 55% to 72%
of the included cases,4,9,15e18,20,21 but none of them show
rates per hospital population.
In our study, 55% of the cases were hospital-acquired
and a further 10% acquired in a NH. One other study report
a similar proportion (65%),15 whereas most studies report
a proportion of 80% or higher.14,16,18,21 This may be ex-
plained by higher incidence in university and referral
hospitals.
A deadly disease or a disease of the dying?
Invasive P. aeruginosa infection is a serious disease with
a high case fatality rate, 35% in our study. Most patients
who died from invasive P. aeruginosa infection died within
a short time of being diagnosed.
The patient groups with the following underlying dis-
eases had the highest mortality risk per 1000 discharges:
malignant neoplasms of lymphoid and haematopoietic
tissue, other diseases of blood and blood-forming organs,
organ transplantation and renal failure. Among the patients
with invasive P. aeruginosa infection the following factors
were independently associated with an increased CFR:
having an underlying risk diagnoses associated with
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P. aeruginosa infection (listed in Table 3); admission to an
ICU; old age and immunosuppressive treatment prior to in-
fection. A clinical P. aeruginosa diagnosis only of UTI was
protective, whereas meningitis, pneumonia and septicae-
mia increased the risk although not signiﬁcantly. Other
studies list similar risk factors.14,17,18,21 As demonstrated
by others,15 bacteraemic pneumonia had a high CFR. Other
studies have examined different combinations of various
risk factors, but we found no contradictions to previously
published studies.
P. aeruginosa can produce a variety of virulence factors
and there is substantial variability among strains.1,3,38,39
The presence of certain virulence factors of the Type III se-
cretion system has showed to increase the relative risk of
death more than six times.38 In the present study we did
not examine the strains for virulence factors.
Limitations
We had access to quality controlled national population and
hospital statistics. However, the numerator data were
collected during an outbreak investigation of P. aeruginosa
infection.26 Although great efforts were made to ensure
that the outbreak investigation was given highest priority,
the quality of the returned questionnaires varied. Extensive
efforts were made to ensure completeness and quality of
the data, including contacting the clinicians and linkage
with the National Population Registry to search for deaths
among patients. Consequently, we believe most of the col-
lected patient data are accurate, but some information
may have been missed, especially regarding some of the
subordinate discharge diagnoses. However, all but three
of the 567 patients had at least one main underlying disease
recorded. As there were few patients in several of the risk
diagnosis groups (Table 3), missing information in either of
these groups could have inﬂuenced the incidence and mor-
tality rates and the case fatality substantially.
All Norwegian medical microbiological laboratories pro-
vided numerator data, and all of them have kept complete
records since 1996. The missing data for the ﬁrst few years
may at least partially explain the measured increase in
incidence. We consider it unlikely that change in microbi-
ological methods or diagnostic use of blood and CSF culture
for detecting Pseudomonas has affected our results
signiﬁcantly.
We may have missed invasive infections, either because
no blood or CSF was cultured, especially in the out-patient
setting, or because culture is not a 100% sensitive. How-
ever, we believe this is an unlikely explanation for our
comparatively low rates. We included 95 cases with Pseudo-
monas not identiﬁed at the species level (Pseudomonas
spp.). These identiﬁcations mainly came from laboratories
that based their identiﬁcation on colony characteristics. Al-
though some isolates may have belonged to other species
and closely related genera, it is likely that most of these
isolates represented P. aeruginosa as other species of Pseu-
domonas rarely causes infection in humans.24
The national hospital statistics on discharge diagnoses
were aggregate data. Thus, we were unable to do individual
level analyses of relative risks for infection (Table 3), nor
controlling for potential confounders by multivariate
regression analysis. As age and gender are the two major
possible confounders that inﬂuence the incidence risks,
we may not easily compare the groups of underlying dis-
eases. However, for the CFR we were able to control for
confounders by binomial multivariate regression.
Conclusions
In this population-based study of invasive P. aeruginosa in-
fection in Norway, we found a much lower incidence than in
single-hospital studies in other countries. The nationwide
study design and prudent antibiotic use in Norway may be
one possible explanation for some of the difference. Risk
of infection is strongly associated with increasing age and
certain underlying diseases. Hospitalised patients with ma-
lignant or other diseases of blood and blood-forming organs
had a 0.2% risk of infection during a hospital stay, which is
10-fold higher than the general hospital population. Around
35% of cases died while hospitalised, either because of the
infection or the underlying disease. Invasive P. aeruginosa
infection remains an important cause of morbidity and
mortality.
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